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EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE REVISITED
I was struck dumb with astonishment at the sentiments . .. [t]hat the
executive alone shall have the right ofjudging what shall be kept secret, and
what shall be made public, and that the representatives of a free people, are
incompetent to determine on the interests of those who delegated them.
- Benjamin Franklin'
Bureaucracy naturally welcomes a poorly informed and hence a powerless
parliament-at least in so far as ignorance somehow agrees with the
bureaucracy's interests.
- Max Weber2
INTRODUCTION
The Bush administration has inspired renewed interest in the topic of
executive branch secrecy, with many claiming that this is "the most secretive
administration in our history.0 If the degree of secrecy in the Bush
administration is unprecedented, the very tendency toward executive secrecy
is nothing new. As Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. has written, a "religion of secrecy"
has been ascendant in the American Presidency since roughly World War II,
serving as an "all-purpose means by which the American Presidency [may]
dissemble its purposes, bury its mistakes, manipulate its citizens, and
maximize its power.
'
,
4
Executive secrecy manifests itself in a staggeringly large (and growing)
system of information classification5 and in case-by-case refusals to disclose
information sought by others. While case-by-case refusals often occur
informally, they are most visible and most notorious when they take the form
of executive privilege claims. A claim of executive privilege is generally a
1. DANIEL N. HOFFMAN, GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 101 (1981)
(alterations in original) (quoting Philadelphia General Advertiser, Dec. 30, 1793, at 3; see also
Editorial of Dec. 28, 1793, id. at 3; Letter of "Z," Dec. 31, 1793, id. at 3).
2. DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY 143 (1998) (quoting Max Weber, Bureaucracy, in
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196, 234 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans. & eds., Oxford University
Press 1946)).
3. Ted Widmer, Making War, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., May 9, 2004, at 7 (reviewing BOB
WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK (2004)); see also, e.g., JOHN W. DEAN, WORSE THAN WATERGATE:
THE SECRET PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH xi (2004); William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto,
State Secrets and Executive Power, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 85, 108 (2005); Dorothy Samuels, Editorial, Psst.
President Bush Is Hard at Work Expanding Government Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2004, at A24.
4. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER,JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 345 (1973).
5. See, e.g., Editorial, Credible Classifications, WASH. PoST,July 13, 2005, at A14; Christina E.
Wells, "National Security" Information and the Freedom of Information Act, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1195,
1201-02 (2004); Scott Shane, Since 2001 (Sharp) Increase in the Number of Documents Classified by the
Government, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2005, § 1; Emerging Threats, and Int'l Relations of the H. Comm. on
Gov't. Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on National Security, 108th Cong. (2005) (formal
statement ofJ. William Leonard, Dir., Info. Sec. Oversight Office of Nat'l Archives and Records
Admin.), http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2005/030205leonard.html.
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claim by the President of a constitutional right to withhold information from
Congress, the courts, or persons or agencies empowered by Congress to seek
information.6 Executive privilege is not mentioned in the text of the
7Constitution, nor is it statutorily authorized, although some commentators
call for statutory recognition of the doctrine.' Rather, executive privilege
claims are based on the notion that some information requests effectively
infringe on the President's Article II powers, threatening his ability to
receive candid advice or to protect national security.9 Recent controversies
involving executive privilege include Vice President Cheney's refusal to turn
over documents relating to energy policy development that were sought by
public interest groups under a public disclosure statute 0 and a number of
tussles between the White House and investigators, both congressional and
commission-based, regarding September 11 and Iraq-related information
requests."
This Article assesses the constitutional validity of executive privilege,
focusing solely on executive privilege disputes between Congress and the
President or other high-ranking executive branch officers. This Article
defines such conflicts broadly to include clashes over information sought
directly by Congress (or by a committee or subcommittee thereof), clashes
over information sought by individuals through congressionally drawn
public access statutes, and clashes over information sought by
congressionally created agencies.
The time is ripe to revisit the constitutional validity of executive
privilege. Reassessing executive privilege has significance both for the
doctrine itself and for executive branch secrecy more generally-including
the nearly complete discretion accorded the executive branch to classify
information -as the justifications for the two overlap substantially.
6. See, e.g., Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege Revived? Secrecy and Conflict During the Bush
Presidency, 52 DUKE L.J. 403, 404 (2002). The term "presidential communications privilege"
sometimes is used to distinguish the privilege discussed in this Article from other forms of
immunity labeled "executive privilege," such as immunity from civil suit while in office. See, e.g.,
In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 735 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1997). This Article will, however, use the
term "executive privilege" to refer solely to the communications aspect of the privilege.
7. See Rozell, supra note 6, at 403-04.
8. See, e.g., Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, A Critical Comment on the Constitutionality of
Executive Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1143, 1148, 1186-89 (1999).
9. See, e.g., U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974); MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER, SECRECY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 43-48 (2002); Archibald Cox,
Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1386, 1410 (1974); Randall K. Miller, Congressional
Inquests: Suffocating the Constitutional Prerogative of Executive Privilege, 81 MINN. L. REV. 631, 640-49
(1997); Rozell, supra note 6, at 404.
10. See infta Part 1.
11. See infta Part 1.
12. See, e.g., Wells, supra note 5, at 1199; Note, Keeping Secrets: Congress, the Courts and
National Security Information, 103 HARV. L. REV. 906, 907-10 (1990) [herinafter Note, Keeping
Secrets].
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Furthermore, the impact of White House secrecy on current events
highlights the systemic significance of information control both between the
political branches and between those branches and the people.
This Article concludes that there is no such thing as a constitutionally
based executive privilege, and courts-in the face of executive privilege
claims-should order compliance with any statutorily authorized demands
for executive branch information. This conclusion is reached in two steps.
First, perusal of Article I's list of legislative powers and Article II's list of
presidential powers does not clearly resolve the question of executive
privilege's constitutional legitimacy. To the contrary, such perusal alone
offers fair ground to deem control of executive branch information both
within Congress's "sweeping clause" power and within the President's power
to execute the law and to perform other Article II tasks. Absent further
analysis, then, one might be tempted to conclude that the judiciary and
some scholars have matters well in hand insofar as they champion a
balancing test that weighs congressional interests in openness against
presidential interests in secrecy. Alternatively, one might side with those who
deem the matter a political question, unfit for resolution by the courts.
Yet analysis of the matter ought not to end there. To the contrary, this
Article argues that there is an additional analytical step, one unrecognized
to date in the doctrine and scholarship that categorically resolves executive
privilege clashes in favor of statutorily authorized access demands. This
second step involves gleaning from a broader analysis of the Constitution
the insight that information has special constitutional significance, and that
it thus is unlike any other tool of power. Specifically, such analysis suggests
that secrecy in government sometimes is a necessary evil, but secrecy within
the political branches must, to be legitimate, remain a politically
controllable tool of the people. To keep government secrecy within the
ultimate control of the people, and hence non-tyrannical, secrecy must be
subject to policies formulated through processes that themselves are visible
and dialogic. Policies so formulated are conclusive over executive privilege
claims for two closely related reasons. First, the process of creating such
policies entails the type of public, dialogic protections that the Constitution
generally demands for regulatory measures. Second, given the unique
dangers of secrecy to a democratic system as reflected throughout the
Constitution, any openness directives generated through such careful and
protective processes must be realistically enforceable.
A useful conceptual hook for understanding these points is a concept
developed largely in the political science literature: that of shallow and deep
secrecy. Shallow secrecy is secrecy, the very existence of which is known,
even while the secrets' contents remain unknown. Deep secrecy is secrecy,
13. SeeNote, Keeping Secrets, supra note 12, at 917.
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the fact of which itself is a secret.' 4 A rough way to state the points made in
the preceding paragraph is that the Constitution demands that secrets
generated by the political branches be shallow and, to make the shallowness
meaningful, politically checkable. Such shallowness and political
checkability should manifest itself in two respects. First, political branch
secrets should be subordinate to any access requirements themselves
formulated through an open, dialogic process. Hence, secrets should be
shallow and politically checkable in the broad sense that they are
subordinate to policies that themselves are transparent and politically
alterable. Second, specific secrets should be subject to being made shallow
or even to having their contents revealed both as a means to enforce the
governing policies and as a means to effectuate the Constitution's textual,
structural, and historical wariness of government secrecy.
This Article thus uses as shorthand the phrase "shallow and politically
checkable" to describe the condition that the Constitution demands of
political branch secrecy. The natural mechanisms to keep secrecy shallow
and politically checkable are statutory authorizations to Congress, to the
public, and to agencies to demand information. The relatively public,
dialogic and deliberative process of legislating helps to ensure that macro-
questions about secrecy and openness are aired in the sunlight, even if the
resulting policies allow some secrecy. Furthermore, statutory openness
mandates create a second level of activity on which specific instances of
secrecy can be challenged and checked by Congress and the people. This
second level of activity has particular significance for the deep/shallow
secrecy distinction. As secrets often exist in layers, stripping away one layer
of secrecy may well expose the existence of others. Perhaps the most famous
example of this point is the revelation of Richard Nixon's oval office tapes. It
was only through its ability to question former presidential aide Alexander
Butterfield that the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities discovered the tapes' existence in the first place. 5 Once the tapes
became a shallow rather than a deep secret, further legal and political
maneuvering could take place in an effort to discover the tapes' content. 6
14. AMy GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 121-26 (1996);
KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW 21-22
(1988); cf. SISELA BOK, SECRETS 112, 202-03 (1982); see also Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the
Immigration Courts and Beyond: Considering the Right to Know in the Administrative State, 39 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95, 100 (2004); Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and
Platforms for Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 909, 920 n.41 (2006); Dennis F. Thompson,
Democratic Secrecy, 114 POL. SCI. Q. 181,183 (1999).
15. See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725,
726-27 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
16. See id. at 726-29. While Senate Select Committee involved congressional efforts to obtain
the tapes, prosecutorial efforts also were made to discover some of the tapes in the context of
criminal proceedings related to the Watergate controversy. The latter efforts manifested
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The nature of the legislative process relative to that of the presidential
office suggests two additional reasons to deem legislative judgments as to
secrecy or openness conclusive over executive privilege objections. First,
from a perspective that understands constitutional structure to value
openness and to see secrecy as a necessary evil that must remain shallow and
politically controllable, the President's special capacity for secrecy suggests
not an Article II right to operate in secret, but rather the crucial importance
of effective political controls over that capacity. This point helps to situate
the executive privilege issue within the larger context of statutory control
over presidential powers. As others have observed, Articles I and II leave
little for the President to do absent statutory authorization. This framework
reflects an understanding of the relative strengths and dangers posed by a
large, deliberative body and by a unitary, energetic, and potentially secretive
actor. While this framework does not mean that Congress can never
unconstitutionally infringe on Article II by constraining presidential powers
once granted and defined, it does suggest that information control, given its
special constitutional significance, must remain within the relatively safe,
open, and deliberative realm of the legislature so as to allow for robust
political checks against presidential secrecy. Second, the legislative process,
with its built-in inefficiencies and built-in role for the President through the
veto power, provides ample safeguards against any potential Article II harms
caused by forced disclosure.
Part I of this Article begins by providing further background on and
examples of executive privilege claims raised in the face of legislatively based
access demands. Part II analyzes existing doctrine and scholarship,
explaining that it provides a useful starting point for analysis, but that more
work must be done because existing accounts fail to consider the special
constitutional role of information. Part III elaborates on this role. Part III.A
explains that a judicial balancing test might be an appropriate response to
executive privilege claims were a tool of power other than information at
stake, but that such an approach ignores information's special constitutional
significance. Part III.A summarizes this significance and elaborates on the
meaning and constitutional relevance of the phrase "shallow and politically
checkable secrecy." Part III.B explains that the Constitution reflects a faith
in openness as the operative norm between the political branches and
between those branches and the people and that the Constitution also leaves
room for occasional government secrecy. It also explains that the
Constitution reflects a compromise between openness and secrecy by
suggesting support only for political secrecy that is shallow and politically
checkable. Part IV explains that constitutional support for shallow and
politically checkable secrecy naturally manifests itself in allowing
themselves most famously in Nixon v. United States, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). For another example of
such prosecutorial efforts, see Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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presidential secrecy to be overseen through statutorily authorized access
demands. Part IV also explains that this Article's approach leaves some room
for objections to access demands based on rationales other than executive
privilege. Part V reflects on the policy nature of the assertions underlying
executive privilege claims as well as the experience with judicial assessment
of those assertions. With respect to the former, Part V cites current and
historical accounts of the often disastrous consequences of presidential
secrecy. While these accounts do not mean that presidential secrecy is never
appropriate, they shed light on the fact that pro-secrecy arguments are
contestable policy judgments, not static constitutional truths. By juxtaposing
this point with a reminder of the judiciary's tendency to defer to executive
privilege claims, Part V sheds light on the wisdom of an approach to
government secrecy grounded in checking mechanisms borne of political
competition.
I. INTRODUCTION TO EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: FURTHER BACKGROUND AND
RELATIONSHIP TO CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION DEMANDS
Although the term "executive privilege" was not used until the
Eisenhower administration, 7 conflicts between the President and coordinate
branches regarding information access date back to the earliest years of the
American republic." Beginning with the Eisenhower administration, some
Presidents have articulated explicit policies on executive privilege through
letters, public statements, and memoranda.' 9 Among the conditions typically
articulated in executive privilege policies are pledges that the privilege will
be used only if invoked or approved by the President" and that it will not be
used to cover up executive branch wrongdoing. Not surprisingly, wide
chasms can exist between policy and practice. For example, Richard Nixon
expressed the view that "the scope of executive privilege must be very
narrowly construed" and pledged "to invoke this authority only in the most
compelling circumstances and after a rigorous inquiry into the actual need
for its exercises."22 These statements are belied, of course, by Nixon's
attempts to use the privilege to cover up criminal activity during the
23Watergate scandal . Similar points have been made with respect to uses of
the privilege and the withholding of executive information generally by the
17. ROZELL, supra note 9, at 39.
18. See, e.g., id., at 28-43; RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH
163-208 (1974); Prakash, supra note 8, at 1177-85; see aLso infra Part III.A.1.
19. ROZELL, supra note 9, at 39-43, 54-57, 73-76, 84-87, 94-95, 106-08, 123-24.
20. See id. at 41-42, 56-57, 95, 124.
21. Id. at 56-57, 124.
22. Id. at 55-56.
23. See, e.g., U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
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Reagan administration during the Oliver North trial2 4 and by the Clinton
administration during inquiries such as the Whitewater and "Travelgate"
25
controversies. Of course, it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify
discrepancies between executive privilege policy and practice where a
President succeeds in an executive privilege claim and thus blocks discovery
of the very information that might have shed light on such discrepancy. 6
As noted above, this Article focuses solely on executive privilege
disputes between Congress and the President, or other high-ranking
executive officials. The disputes with which this Article is concerned thus
can arise in one of several ways. First, Congress may exercise its legislative
power to create a public information access statute and the President or
another high-ranking executive officer may resist disclosure under such
statute on explicit or implicit executive privilege grounds. A recent example
of such a clash is Vice President Cheney's refusal to release information
sought by public interest groups under public disclosure provisions of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act ("FACA"). 7 In the FACA, Congress
provided that federal advisory committees must follow a number of public
disclosure requirements including holding public meetings and making
transcripts, records, and other materials available to the public upon
request.21 Shortly after taking office in 2001, President Bush created the
National Energy Policy Development Group ("NEPDG") and placed Vice
President Cheney at its head.29 Two public interest groups sought
information about NEPDG and its membership, arguing that NEPDG met
the statutory definition of a federal advisory committee and that the
committee had shirked its public disclosure obligations under the FACA.3°
While Vice President Cheney technically did not invoke executive privilege
in response, his argument was steeped in executive privilege principles.
Specifically, he maintained that the separation of powers prevents the FACA
from applying to the Vice President because such application would impede
the Vice President's ability to receive candid advice.
24. See, e.g., HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 29-34 (1987).
25. ROZELL, supra note 9, at 124-46.
26. See, e.g., id., at 146; cf KOH, supra note 24, at 31-32.
27. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15(b).
28. Id. §§ 10, 11. The FACA also imposes other requirements on federal advisory
committees beyond the public disclosure mandate. See id. §§ 9, 10.
29. Walker v. Cheney, 230 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54 (D.D.C. 2002);Judicial Watch v. Nat'l Energy
Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2002); NAT. ENERGY POLICY DEv. GROUP,
REPORT viii (2001) [hereinafter NEPDG Report]; Vikram David Amar, The Cheney Decision--A
Missed Chance to Straighten Out Some Muddled Issues, CATO SUP. CT. REv. 185, 185 (2003-2004).
30. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 372 (2004);Judicial Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d at
23-24, 33.
31. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 375; In re Cheney, 334 F.3d 1096, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Judicial
Watch, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 44-45; Amar, supra note 29, at 187-89; see John W. Dean, More
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Second, Congress may exercise its legislative power to create a
commission with information-gathering authority that explicitly or implicitly
applies to the President or other high-ranking executive officers, and such
officers may resist disclosure on explicit or implicit grounds of executive
privilege. A recent example of this is the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States ("Commission"), created by statute in
November of 2002.2 Congress charged the Commission with the tasks of
"examin[ing] and report[ing] upon the facts and causes relating to the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001" and "recommend[ing]
corrective measures that can be taken to prevent [future] acts of
terrorism."3 The Commission had the statutory power to hold hearings and
34to seek out witnesses and information. The Commission was authorized to
issue subpoenas with the consent either of the Commission Chairman and
35Vice-Chairman or of six members of the Commission. Subpoenas were
enforceable in federal district court through civil contempt actions.36
Subpoenas also could be enforced, upon the vote of a majority of
Commissioners, through criminal contempt actions. 37 The Commission
encountered resistance from the White House with respect to some
important information sought, including the public testimony of then
National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice, the testimony of President
George W. Bush, and the turning over of presidential daily briefings. In
justifying its resistance, the White House cited national security concerns as
well as the need for candor in White House discussions and the consequent
danger of allowing high-level officials to testify about such discussions. 39 The
Commission was reluctant to use its subpoena power, and the White House
Litigation Will Follow on the Cheney Energy Task Force, CNN.cOM, July 5, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/07/05/dean.cheney/index.html.
32. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-
306, 116 Stat. 2384 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 112002)).
33. § 602(1), (5), 116 Stat. 2408.
34. § 605(a)(1), 116 Stat. 2410.
35. § 605(a)(2), 116 Stat. 2410.
36. § 605(a)(2)(B)(i), 116 Stat. 2410-11.
37. § 605(a)(2)(B)(ii), 1l6Stat. 2411.
38. See, e.g., Edward Epstein, Bush Relents--Rice to Testify to 9/11 Panel, President Says He
Wants to Give the Public a "Complete Picture," S.F. CHRON., Mar. 31, 2004, at Al; James G. Lakely,
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2004, at Al; How the Bush Administration Sought to Obstruct and Discredit the
9/11 Investigation, AM. PROGRESS, July 20, 2004, http://www.americanprogress.org/
site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=124722; Sharon Kehnemui, Senators Push for Rice Testimony,
FoxNEWS.COM, Mar. 30, 2004, http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly story/
0,3566,115569,00.html; Chris Strohm, 9-11 Commission Sets Precedent for Executive Privilege
Challenges, GovEXEC.COM, July 29, 2004, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0704/
072904cl.htm.
39. See supra note 38.
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and the Commission eventually reached agreements without resorting to
40
such power.
Third, Congress may itself seek information for investigative purposes,
usually through a committee or subcommittee of one of its chambers, and
the President or other high-ranking executive officers may resist testifying or
turning over information on explicit or implicit grounds of executive
privilege. A recent example involves the Joint Inquiry of the Select
Committee of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee of the
House of Representatives Regarding the Terrorist Attacks of September 11,
2001 ("Joint Inquiry"). 4' The Joint Inquiry was formed by the two
committees named in its title to help study terrorist threats against the
United States, including the circumstances surrounding the attacks of
September 11, to assess weaknesses in the United States' ability to address
42such threats and to make recommendations. The Joint Inquiry preceded
the 9/11 Commission. Indeed, Congress formed the Commission partly to
follow up on the work of the Joint Inquiry43 in light of perceptions that the
latter had failed to make much headway." These perceptions were due in
part to the Joint Inquiry's failure to obtain some important information.43
The information failures were due largely to executive privilege and related
clashes, including White House refusals to turn over presidential daily
briefings. 46 Although the Joint Inquiry did not use its subpoena authority,
congressional committees have a statutory subpoena power and the statutory
40. Id. See also, e.g., Brian Montopoli, Schlep to Judgment, WASH. MONTHLY, Sept. 2003,
available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2003/0309.montopoli.html; Letter
from Alberto Gonzales, White House Counsel, to Thomas Kean, 9-11 Commission Chairman,
and Lee Hamilton, 9-11 Commission Vice Chairman, (Mar. 30, 2004), available at
www.foxnews.com/printer.friendlystory/0,3566,115618,00.html; Statement of September 11 h
Commission in Response to White House Counsel Letter (Mar. 30, 2004), available at
www.foxnews.com/printer -friendly.story/0,3566,115620,00.html.
41. See 148 CONG. REC. H3493 (daily ed. June 12, 2002) (statement of Rep. Goss).
42. Id.
43. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-
306, 116 Stat. 2384 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 602(3) (A) (Supp. II 2002)).
44. See, e.g., Eric Boehlert, Is the 9/11 Commission Too Soft?, VOICES OF SEPT. 11'", Oct. 10,
2003, http://www.voicesofseptl .org/news/101003.php; Montopoli, supra note 40.
45. See, e.g., Michael Isikoff & Mark Hosenball, The Secrets of September 11, NEWSWEEK, Apr.
30, 2003, available at http://www.keepmedia.com/jsp/article-detail-print.sp (same); see also
Eric Boehlert, supra note 44; John W. Dean, The 9/11 Report Raises More Serious Questions About the
White House Statements on Intelligence, FINDLAw.cOM, July 29, 2003, http://writ.findlaw.com/
dean/20030729.html; Montopoli, supra note 40; cf, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS, SENATORS SPAR OVERJOINT COMMITTEE'S SEPTEMBER
11 REPORT, WASHINGTON FILE, JULY 25, 2003, available at http://www.iwar.org.uk/news-
archive/2003/07-25-2.htrn (discussing secrecy in the delayed release and extensive classification
of the Joint Inquiry Report).
46. Dean, supra note 45; Montopoli, supra note 40.
92 IOWA LA WREVIEW
ability to enforce such power through criminal contempt actions upon the
majority vote of a congressional chamber. 47
II. EXISTING DOCTRINE AND SCHOLARSHIP
Existing doctrine and scholarship that support a qualified executive
privilege provide useful insights with respect to the possible costs of
openness. Furthermore, existing scholarship opposed to executive privilege
illuminates the questionable nature of any claims grounded in the notion of
broad executive discretion to operate apart from congressional oversight
and direction. These arguments suffer, however, from their failure to look
beyond the list of powers in Articles I and II to consider whether the
Constitution sheds special light on information control as a political tool of
power. With respect to existing doctrine and scholarship supportive of a
qualified executive privilege, this omission leads analytically and as a
practical matter to excessive deference to the executive branch. With respect
to scholarly arguments against executive privilege, this omission forces
reliance on a rejection of implied presidential powers generally. The latter
proposition is somewhat questionable. In any event, the alternative
argument that information control cannot be deemed an implied
presidential power for reasons specific to that power substantially enhances
the position against executive privilege.
A. EXISTING DOCTRNE
Executive privilege clashes between Congress and the White House
rarely reach the courthouse and are even less likely to result in judicial
•• 48
merits decisions. Nonetheless, existing doctrine on executive privilege
plays an important shadow function even in those executive privilege
disputes that never approach judicial intervention. For one thing, judicial
doctrine infuses the public debate on executive privilege, with executive
branch officials frequently echoing the Supreme Court's pronouncement in
United States v. Nixon to the effect that presidents must be able to discuss
matters with advisors in secret to ensure candor.49 When the White House
47. 2 U.S.C. §§ 192, 194 (2000); Todd D. Peterson, Prosecuting Executive Branch Officials for
Contempt of Congress, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 563, 568 (1991). There is also some statutory question as
to whether Congress currently possesses a civil contempt remedy with respect to executive
branch officers. Compare Neil Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest
Proposal-Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 117 (1996), with Peterson, supra, at 567-68.
Furthermore, Congress has inherent authority itself to fine and even temporarily imprison
recalcitrant witnesses, although this power has not been used in many years. See Devins, supra, at
116; Peterson, supra, at 567.
48. See Joel D. Bush, Congressional-Executive Access Disputes: Legal Standards and Political
Settlements, 9J.L. & POL. 719,735 (1993).
49. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-06 (1974). For recent executive branch
invocations of this rationale, see, e.g., Epstein, supra note 38; Shannen W. Coffin, Energy and the
Executive: Bush and Cheney Have Rightly Stood irm in the Ongoing Energy Controversy, NAT'L REV.
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resisted having Condoleeza Rice testify publicly and under oath before the
9/11 Commission, for example, Rice emphasized on national television that
"[n]othing would be better, from my point of view, than to be able to
testify," but the legal principles at issue simply prevented it. ' Furthermore,
the possibility of judicial intervention surely impacts the willingness of both
Congress (or its agents or the public acting pursuant to statutory right) and
the Executive to press their respective positions. Members of the 9/11
Commission stated, for example, that they were reluctant to seek judicial
resolution of information disputes because of the substantial, possibly
prohibitive, delay that a court battle would engender.5' Similarly, the
chairman of the House Government Reform Committee noted his
reluctance to subpoena the Bush administration for documents related to
Hurricane Katrina, explaining that a subpoena "would be tied up in court by
the administration until the Committee's writ had expired."52 Further, the
General Accounting Office ("GAO") declined to appeal after losing on
jurisdictional grounds in a suit that it filed to seek information about
NEPDG that was separate from the public interest groups' lawsuits cited
above. The GAO explained that an appellate decision might further erode
51its information-gathering powers.
Existing doctrine bears three major characteristics. First, despite the
Supreme Court's admonition that its analysis in United States v. Nixon does
not necessarily apply to legislative/executive disputes,54 the Court and lower
courts have since indicated that the Nixon Court's framework, or something
much like it, governs any such dispute decided on the merits. 55 While the
Nixon Court rejected the specific claim of executive privilege before it, it
deemed executive privilege doctrine itself valid. The Court further
ONLINE, June 24, 2004, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1159384/posts; Paul
Courson, GAO Files Unprecedented Suit Against Cheney, CNN.COM, Feb. 22, 2002,
http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/02/22/enron.gao.lawsuit/index.html.
50. Rice Steadfast in Refusal to Publicly Testify, MSNBC, Mar. 28, 2004,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4601195/.
51. Dan Eggen, White House Holding Notes Taken by 9/11 Commission, WASH. POST, Jan. 31,
2004, at A02.
52. Dana Milbank, Bush's Fumbles Spur New Talk of Oversight on Hill WASH. POST, Dec. 18,
2005, at A7.
53. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTORS, ENERGY
TASK FORCE: PROCESS USED TO DEVELOP THE NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY 3 n.7 (2003); John W.
Dean, GAO's Final Energy Task Force Report Reveals that the Vice President Made a False Statement to
Congress, FINDLAw.COM, Aug. 29, 2003, http://www.writ.news.findlaw.com/
dean/ 20030829. htm 1.
54. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 712 n.19.
55. See Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443, 446-50 (1977); Ass'n of Am.
Physicians and Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 909 (D.C. Cir. 1993); cf Senate Select Comm.
on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 729, 731-33 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(applying a Nixon-style balancing test shortly prior to U.S. v. Nixon to resolve a dispute between
the President and a congressional committee).
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suggested that the need for candor in executive branch discussions justifies a
presumption in favor of the privilege5 6 and that national security based
privilege claims merit even greater protection. 57 The Court explained that
"the silence of the Constitution" with respect to executive privilege is not
dispositive, quoting an earlier case's discussion of McCulloch v. Maryland to
the effect that "that which [is] reasonably appropriate and relevant to the
exercise of a granted power [is] to be considered as accompanying the
grant."' The Nixon Court also noted that the "confidentiality of Presidential
communications" bears such a relationship to the President's Article II
powers.59 Finally, the Court suggested that the presumption favoring a
privilege claim is at its strongest and necessitates extreme, possibly absolute,
judicial deference where the claim purportedly is grounded in national
security interests. 6°
Second, in the context of disputes generated by congressional
investigations, such as those generated when subpoenas are issued to
executive branch officials, courts have either applied a Nixon-style balancing
test,6' avoided judicial resolution entirely through aggressive use of
threshold doctrines such as standing,62 or encouraged political resolution
but ultimately balanced interests when such resolution was ineffective.63
Third, in the context of disputes generated by public access statutes, courts
generally have construed statutes narrowly to avoid the separation of powers
56. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708, 713.
57. Id. at 710-11; see also In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 743 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating
that the Nixon Court implied that the national security based privilege is "close to absolute").
58. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705-06 n.16 (quoting Marshal v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 537 (1917)
(citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819))).
59. Id. at 705-06.
60. Id. at 706, 710-11; see also In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 743 n.12.
61. See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725,
729, 731-33 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
62. See Walker v. Cheney, 230 F. Supp. 2d 51, 53-54, 65, 68-70 (D.D.C. 2002) (explaining
that the standing inquiry must be "especially rigorous" in GAO lawsuit against Dick Cheney
because of separation of powers issues and that while Congress might have an interest in
receiving the requested information, its statutory authorization to the GAO to conduct
investigations was not sufficiently timely or specific to invoke this interest); cf United States v.
U.S. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150, 151-53 (D.D.C. 1983) (refusing to decide
merits of executive privilege claim made by EPA head in response to subpoena and House
contempt vote because U.S. Attorney had not yet initiated criminal contempt prosecution).
63. A trilogy of district court and circuit court opinions in United States v. AT&T combined
encouragement of political resolution with judicial balancing. While the district court used
judicial balancing to decide in the government's favor, United States v. AT&T, 419 F. Supp. 454,
458-61 (1976), the circuit court issued two opinions, one criticizing the district court for
excessive deference to the executive branch and instructing the district court to facilitate inter-
branch negotiations, United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384, 392-95 (1976), and a subsequent
opinion acknowledging that negotiations had not resolved all matters and directing the parties
to take steps designed to approach a rough middle ground between their respective positions.
United States v. AT&T, 567 F.2d 121, 123, 130-33 (1977).
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problems that might arise were disclosure by the President or someone close
64 65thereto deemed statutorily required. In all but one case, this has meant
that courts have not ordered public access in the face of executive privilege
claims. Instead, courts have construed statutes very narrowly to avoid what
courts deem serious separation of powers questions.
These approaches suffer from both analytical and practical problems.
Such approaches are problematic analytically to the extent that they assume
the ready applicability of the U.S. v. Nixon balancing test and rationale to
legislative/executive disputes. The Nixon Court was correct to limit its
approach to the criminal trial context. Whether the judiciary should
recognize an evidentiary privilege that it can weigh against other interests is
a very different question from whether judicial and/or executive branch
limitations should be imposed on legislatively mandated disclosures. The
latter question asks who should have the final word in making political and
policy decisions about when it is safe and wise to disclose information. To
answer that question one must look to the light shed by Articles I and II on
whether information control is a legislative power, an executive power, or a
shared power, and, if such light is inconclusive, one should consider
whether the Constitution's approach to information control as a whole
64. See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.s. 440, 452-67 (1989) (acknowledging
that the ABA's Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary could be deemed "utilized" by the
President as the FACA requires under at least "one common sense" interpretation of the word,
but looking beyond this interpretation because of serious separation of powers concerns); Ass'n
of Am. Physicians and Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 903-11 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Citing
serious separation of powers concerns, the court decided what it called a close statutory
question to deem Hillary Clinton a government officer or employee, making the FACA
inapplicable to the health-care task force that she chaired. Id.
65. In Nixon v. Adm 'r of Gen. Servs., the Court considered the facial constitutionality of Title
I of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act. 433 U.S. 425 (1977). The Act
was passed in the wake of an agreement reached by former President Richard Nixon and the
Administrator of General Services ("AGS") to give Nixon private title to his extensive archives of
presidential recordings and papers (including the infamous White House tapes) and to have
the materials deposited near Nixon's California home. Id. The agreement included a provision
for the eventual destruction of the White House tapes after a period of several years. Id. at 430-
32. The Act, designed to abrogate the agreement, prohibited destruction of the Nixon materials
and required the AGS to retain control of them. Id. at 433-36. In rejecting Nixon's facial
challenge to the statute on executive privilege grounds, the Court invoked United States v. Nixon
and its balancing test, but deemed any balancing test met. Id. at 443, 446-50. While the Court
focused partly on the public interests vindicated by the statute, id. at 452-54, the crux of its
analysis rested on the fact that the Court did not consider the Act to have strongly infringed on
executive autonomy. Id. at 446-55. First, the privilege was raised by a former President with
respect to the materials of a previous administration. Id. at 429. The Court thus deemed the risk
of a chilling effect on future Presidents and their advisors relatively minimal. Id. at 448-51.
Second, the privilege claim was actively opposed by Gerald Ford (President at the time of the
litigation's initiation) and Jimmy Carter (President by the conclusion of the Supreme Court
litigation). Id. at 441, 448-51. Third, the Nixon materials remained within the executive branch
through the AGS. Id. at 443-44, 451-52. Fourth, the statute explicitly preserved the right to
raise privilege claims regarding materials affected by the AGS' regulations. Id. at 444, 450-51,
455.
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weighs in on the question. Courts have not approached the latter half of
such analysis and have only skimmed the surface of the former half, largely
assuming that forced disclosure imposes burdens on the President of a
constitutional dimension, that courts should try to avoid the difficult
separation of powers questions raised as a result, and thatjudicial resolution
on the merits involves a Nixon-style balancing test.
These judicial approaches cause unsurprising practical problems that
tend to favor the executive branch. Courts, acknowledging that they are not
well equipped to balance the interests at stake in executive privilege
clashes,6 are prepared to give the executive nearly insurmountable
deference in the realm of national security, as represented by the national
security aspect of the Nixon Court's reasoning. 6' Even where national
security is not at issue, judicial wariness to second-guess the executive is
exemplified both by the Nixon Court's presumption favoring executive
privilege claims and by aggressive judicial use of avoidance doctrines. In
refusing to endorse relatively intuitive interpretations of public access and
investigative authorization statutes, courts may frustrate legislative intent to
avoid what courts, using questionable reasoning, deem separation of powers
problems. 68
66. See Ass'n ofAm. Physicians & Surgeons, 997 F.2d at 910.
67. Such deference is fairly standard with respect to national security, given the judiciary's
sense that it lacks expertise in this area. National security related deference manifests itself also
in judicial treatment of the state secrets evidentiary privilege. See, e.g., Weaver & Pallito, supra
note 3. It also manifests itself in challenges to government classification decisions under the
FOIA. See, e.g., Robert P. Deyling, Judicial Deference and De Novo Review in Litigation over National
Security Information Under the Freedom of Information Act, 37 VILL. L. REv. 67, 82-87 (1992); Bruce
E. Fein, Access to Classified Information: Constitutional and Statutory Dimensions, 26 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 805, 821 n.72 (1985); Wells, supra note 5, at 1207-08. For a notable exception in the realm
of executive privilege, see AT&T II, 551 F.2d at 392 (criticizing the district court for excessive
deference to the executive branch). See supra note 63 for more discussion of the AT&T
opinions.
68. It also is striking that the Supreme Court minimized the relative importance of public
access statutes in Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, stating:
Even if FACA embodies important congressional objectives, the only consequence
from respondents' inability to obtain the discovery they seek is that it would be
more difficult for private complainants to vindicate Congress's policy objectives
under FACA. And even if, for argument's sake . . . FACA's statutory objectives
would be to some extent frustrated, it does not follow that a court's Article III
authority or Congress's central Article I powers would be impaired. The situation
here cannot, in fairness, be compared to Nixon, where a court's ability to fulfill its
constitutional responsibility to resolve cases and controversies within its
jurisdiction hinges on the availability of certain indispensable information.
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 384-85 (2004).
The Court held that Vice President Cheney may make a blanket challenge to all
discovery in a FACA litigation rather than making specific challenges to particular discovery
requests. Id. at 383-91. The Court cited the separation of powers concerns that the FACA would
raise if it applied to a vice-presidential task force and the relative insignificance of any
frustration to the FACA's objectives. Id. at 381-91.
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B. MAJOR SCHOLARLYARGUMENTS
The major scholarly arguments can be grouped into three categories:
those that support a qualified executive privilege whereby the judiciary can
apply a balancing test to weigh executive privilege claims against
congressional access demands; those that deem executive privilege a
"constitutional myth" in light of history, constitutional text, and
constitutional structure; and those that advocate that the judiciary refrain
partly or completely from resolving executive privilege disputes. While these
neat categories oversimplify the literature and exclude some more nuanced
views,69 they mark an attempt to capture the most prevalent and pronounced
divisions among scholars.
• • 70
Arguments favoring a qualified executive privilege, exemplified by the
71
seminal work of Mark J. Rozell, partly echo the logic of Nixon v. United
69. See generally Peterson, supra note 47 (discussing implications of criminal contempt
citations resulting from executive privilege disputes); Peter M. Shane, Legal Disagreement and
Negotiation in a Government of Laws: The Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN.
L. REV. 461 (1987) (advocating a negotiation based approach to executive privilege disputes).
70. The text of this Subpart does not discuss arguments for an absolute executive privilege
because such arguments have been made predominantly outside of the academic literature,
generally prior to the Supreme Court's embrace of a qualified executive privilege in Nixon v.
United States, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). See, e.g., Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 730, 737-38, 742-45,
750-52 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (MacKinnon,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing for
absolute privilege with respect to both judicial and congressional requests for information); id.
at 768-72, 773-81, 795-99 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (same); Brief for Respondent, Cross-
Petitioner Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, at 48-68, Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(Nos. 73-1766, 73-1839) [hereinafter Nixon Merits Brief] (arguing for absolute privilege in
judicial-executive conflicts but using reasoning broad enough to apply to congressional-
legislative disputes); see also, e.g., BERGER, supra note 18, at 8-9 (citing statements of then
Attorney General William H. Rehnquist and then Attorney General William P. Rogers in
support of absolute executive privilege). At the core of the argument for an absolute executive
privilege is the notion that the powers accorded the President in Article II, particularly the
vesting of executive power in the President, encompass whatever is "essential" to the effective
exercise of such powers. Nixon, 487 F.2d at 750 (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Nixon Merits Brief, supra, at 54. The premise that presidential information
control is so essential underlies this point. Proponents of an absolute executive privilege largely
echo the reasoning of the Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon in this respect. See Nixon v.
Sirica, 487 F.2d at 743 (MacKinnon,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Nixon
Merits Brief, supra, at 63-68. The argument that the President is better situated than a federal
judge to determine when secrecy or openness is necessary to the effective execution of the law
accompanies this point. See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d at 795-96 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
Proponents of an absolute privilege also rely on historical arguments similar to those made by
proponents of a qualified privilege. See id. at 730-37 (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 775-81 (Wilkey,J., dissenting); Nixon Merits Brief, supra, at 54-59.
71. See generally ROZELL, supra note 9; Rozell, supra note 6. For other academic works
supportive of a qualified executive privilege, see, e.g., J. Richard Broughton, Paying Ambition's
Debt: Can the Separation-of-Powers Tame the Impetuous Vortex of Congressional Investigations?, 21
WHITTIER L. REV. 797, 821-30 (2000); Dawn Johnsen, Executive Privilege Since United States v.
Nixon: Issues of Motivation and Accommodation, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1127, 1127-28, 1131 (1999);
Randall K. Miller, Congressional Inquests: Suffocating the Constitutional Prerogative of Executive
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States. That is, Rozell emphasizes the President's need for candid advice v2
and for leeway in protecting national security and negotiating foreign
policy7 3 to fulfill his Article II functions. Rozell also argues that history
supports a qualified executive privilege, citing a series of post-ratification
disputes that are addressed in Part III.A.1. Rozell further argues that the
Constitution's framers and the ratifying generation as a whole envisioned a
strong executive with the capacity to keep secrets. 4 Rozell states, for
example, that "two passages from the Federalist Papers support executive
branch secrecy": Federalist 70, in which Alexander Hamilton supports a
unitary President because "'[d]ecision, activity, secrecy and despatch [sic]
will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more
eminent degree than the proceedings of any great number' 75 and Federalist
64, in which John Jay champions the relative "'secrecy"' and "'despatch
[sic] "' of the executive branch as an advantage in treaty-making.
76
It also is worth noting that while Rozell argues that the presumption in
judicial balancing "generally should ... favor ... openness," 7 other aspects
of his discussion reflect the difficulty of applying this presumption. Rozell
observes, for example, that "[t]he Court [has] made it clear that when a
claim of privilege is made to protect national security or foreign policy
deliberations, that claim is often difficult for another branch to overcome in
a balancing of constitutional powers.78
Arguments against executive privilege are grounded in the structure of
Articles I and II, and in history. Raoul Berger, perhaps the best known critic
of executive privilege,79 emphasizes the extent to which Congress is
Privilege, 81 MINN. L. REv. 631, 635, 684-85 (1997); see alsoJeffrey P. Carlin, Note, Walker v.
Cheney: Politics, Posturing and Executive Privilege, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 235, 270-71 (2002).
72. ROZELL, supra note 9, at 46-48.
73. Id. at 43-46. Rozell also argues that there are internal limits on the scope of Congress's
investigative powers. Id. at 48-50. As discussed infra at Part IV.C.1, such arguments are best
categorized as distinct from executive privilege claims.
74. Id. at 19-28.
75. Id. at 24 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961)).
76. Id. at 24-25 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
77. ROZELL, supra note 9, at 19, 156.
78. Id. at 164.
79. Interestingly, while the title of Berger's seminal book and much about his tone suggest
an outright rejection of executive privilege, see, e.g., BERGER, supra note 18, at 346 ("Congress is
entitled to share all the information that pertains to its affairs."); ROZELL, supra note 9, at 49
(characterizing Berger as "believ[ing] that Congress has an absolute, unlimited power to
compel disclosure of all executive branch information"), Berger does not reject executive
privilege in its entirety. In fact, Berger states that any curtailment of Congress's ability to inquire
into executive branch information "is a judicial, not a presidential, function." BERGER, supra
note 18, at 31; see also id. at 356 (describing a test that the judiciary should apply to executive
privilege claims). Nonetheless, while Berger's arguments technically are directed against an
absolute executive privilege, Berger's emphasis clearly is on eviscerating the foundations of this
concept rather than on supporting counterpoints that the judiciary might weigh against the
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empowered to control the Executive through the impeachment power,
through the Senate's confirmation and treaty ratification roles, and through
the legislation that creates, maintains, and effectuates the laws that the
President executes.8s From this, Berger concludes that Congress is the
government's "senior partner" to the President's 'junior partner"s and that
it would be illogical for the junior partner to have the power to pick and
choose the information on which the senior partner might draw to assess the
junior partner's activities or otherwise to perform the senior partner'sS 81
functions. With respect to history, Berger argues that the founding
generation feared a too-powerful executive and that the founders would
never have empowered the executive to withhold information.3 Berger also
cites the post-ratification information disputes cited by Rozel, s4 concluding
that they lend no support to the constitutional legitimacy of executive
privilege. s
Whereas Berger focuses predominantly on Congress's functional need
for information, other executive privilege opponents emphasize the absence
of any structural hint of implied presidential powers. The most detailed
86
argument to this effect has been made by Saikrishna Prakash, whose points
overlap in some important respects with an argument made by William Van
Alstyne. s7 Prakash details the many respects in which the Constitution leaves
the President at the mercy of Congress to determine the nature and efficacy
of the President's powers: The President is entitled to no particular budget
beyond that granted him by Congress, despite the fact that, "[w]ithout a
steady and sufficient supply of funds, the President cannot possibly satisfy his
constitutional duties or fulfill the promise of his executive powers.
" 8
Congress possesses the sole constitutional power to create the armed forces,
to call out the militia, and to maintain and provide for the same, thus
empowering Congress to leave the President as "Commander-in-Chief... of
privilege. Berger's work thus remains an important source of arguments against executive
privilege, even if technically directed against an absolute privilege.
80. BERGER, supra note 18, at 35-37, 49-162.
81. Id. at7, 13,346.
82. Id.; see also Gary J. Schmitt, Executive Privilege: Presidential Power to Withhold Information
from Congress, in THE PRESIDENCY IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 155 (Joseph M. Bessette &
Jeffrey Tulis eds., 1981) ("The heart of Berger's argument is that the office of the president was
never meant to be so independent of Congress as to justify the implied power of executive
privilege.").
83. BERGER, supra note 18, at 49-51, 58-59.
84. Id. at 163-208. See Part III.A.1 for this Article's brief discussion of the debate over
post-ratification incidents.
85. Id. at 207.
86. See generally Prakash, supra note 8.
87. See generally William W. Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers
of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause, 40
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 102 (Spring 1976).
88. Prakash, supra note 8, at 1154.
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absolutely no one from time to time.""9 Congress alone can "staff[] the
Executive Department" by creating and funding various agencies, offices,
and officers, despite the fact that the President surely requires extensive
assistance in executing the law.9° Given these facts, Prakash asks, "how can
we believe that the President has either an inherent or a penumbral right to
secret communications? . . . [C]onstitutional structure makes clear that
[even more important presidential means] are completely left to Congress
to provide."9'
Prakash relies not only on constitutional grants of specific congressional
powers but also on implications from the Necessary and Proper Clause,
which empowers Congress to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any Department or Officer thereof."9 ' Prakash explains, as William Van
Alstyne similarly has argued, that the Necessary and Proper Clause
empowers only Congress to provide the means necessary to effectuate its
own powers, as well as the powers of the other branches.93
Finally, Prakash considers historical evidence. To begin with, Prakash
notes that there is no clear pre-ratification support for executive privilege.
9 4
Prakash acknowledges Rozell's references to the championing by framers,
95including in two Federalist Papers, of the President's capacity for secrecy.
Prakash points out, however, that these references "hardly demonstrate that
the proposed executive would enjoy a constitutional right to an executive
privilege." 96 The references instead serve only to describe "one of the
common attributes of a single executive. . . . In the ordinary course, the
President would be able to keep some matter secret."97 Whether the
President has a constitutional right to keep secrets in the face of
congressional requests is another matter. Regarding the post-ratification
disputes analyzed by other scholars, Prakash notes the risk of relying too
heavily on post-ratification events as evidence of constitutional meaning.98
Prakash does, however, examine three conflicts from the Washington
administration discussed by Rozell, given the conflicts' relative proximity to
ratification. 99 Much like Berger, Prakash concludes that these incidents do
89. Id. at 1157-59.
90. Id. at 1159-64.
91. Id. at 1163.
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 18.
93. Prakash, supra note 8, at 1164-69; Van Alstyne, supra note 87, at 107, 116-29.
94. Prakash, supra note 8, at 1173-77.
95. Id. at 1175-76.
96. Id. at 1176.
97. Id.
98. Id. at1173&n.106.
99. Prakash, supra note 8, at 1177-85.
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not support the argument for executive privilege and that aspects of the
incidents in fact support contrary arguments.'00
Finally, many scholars argue that the judiciary should exercise restraint
in approaching executive privilege disputes. Some argue that the judiciary
should treat such disputes as political questions and avoid addressing their
merits because executive privilege controversies ask the judiciary to decide
"whose political judgment is better-Congress's or the president's, and ...
the judiciary is ill equipped to so decide."'0 ' For similar reasons, others
advocate judicial intervention only as a last resort. Mark Rozell believes, for
example, that most executive privilege controversies should be resolved
through the "political ebb and flow of the separation of powers system,"1
0 2
although he acknowledges, as discussed above, that functional balancing by
the judiciary is necessary in some cases.
With respect to arguments grounded in constitutional text and
structure, scholarly support for a qualified executive privilege suffers from
largely the same problems that characterize executive privilege doctrine.
Scholarly opposition to executive privilege, while laying important
groundwork by demonstrating the limited nature of presidential power,
suffers from its failure to explore the special constitutional significance of
information control. As discussed in Part III, it is not so clear that no small,
judicially checkable zone of implied powers attaches to the presidential
office. Even if the presidency does contain some implied powers, however,
there are reasons to deem information control special from a constitutional
perspective and consequently outside the realm of such powers. Indeed,
these reasons offer an important alternative basis to reject executive
privilege even for those who do not reject implied presidential powers
completely. Finally, to the extent that the Constitution demands obedience
from the executive branch to statutory openness directives, such directives
should be judicially enforced where enforcement is provided statutorily
rather than treated as political questions or otherwise judicially avoided.
With respect to historical arguments, those scholars who deem the post-
ratification evidence inconclusive for establishing a constitutional executive
privilege have the better of the argument, as discussed briefly in Part III.A.1.
With respect to the oft-cited references to secrecy in the Federalist Papers, a
100. Id. See Part III.A.1 for this Article's brief discussion of the debate over post-ratification
incidents.
101. Schmitt, supra note 82, at 181. Todd Peterson also suggests that, by and large,
executive privilege controversies should not be resolved by the judiciary. Peterson, supra note
47, at 625-31.
102. Rozell, supra note 6, at 6. Others take a middle ground similar to that of Rozell,
arguing that the judiciary should become no more involved in executive privilege controversies
than it already is and that any judicial involvement should focus more on encouraging inter-
party negotiation than on resolving the merits of the dispute. See, e.g., Bush, supra note 48, at
745-47; Devins, supra note 47, at 110, 126-37.
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careful look at the relevant Papers in fact militates against, rather than in
favor of, a constitutional executive privilege, as discussed in Part III.B.3.c.
III. SECRECY AND SEPARATED POWERS:
THE ARGUMENT FOR A NEW APPROACH TO EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
A. GETTING 70 THE NEWAPPROACH: OVERLAPPINGPOWERSAND THE
SPECIAL CONSTI TIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF INFORMA 7ON CONTROL
This Part lays the groundwork for understanding the role that the
constitutional significance of information control should play in executive
privilege analysis. This Part explains, first, that history does not support a
constitutional executive privilege. Second, this Part explains that Articles I
and II might at first glance suggest that Congress and the President share
overlapping powers with respect to textually unnamed tools of law
execution, such as information control. Were information control like any
other tool of power, a functional balancing approach and some degree of
judicial restraint ordinarily might be appropriate. Third, this Subpart
introduces the idea that information is not, for constitutional purposes, like
any other tool of power. Rather, constitutional analysis suggests that
government secrecy, while sometimes necessary, must be kept on a tight
political leash to prevent it from becoming a tool of tyranny. Specifically, the
Constitution suggests that government secrecy must be shallow and
politically checkable.
1. History and Executive Privilege
As noted in Part II.B, the two major sources of historical evidence
typically offered to support executive privilege doctrine are a series of post-
ratification incidents said to demonstrate an early embrace of executive
privilege, and the two passages from the Federalist Papers touting secrecy as
a virtue of the unitary President.10 3 The debate over the post-ratification
incidents is so well-worn in the scholarly literature that it does not bear
much additional discussion. 10 4 It suffices to state in the text of this Section
with some elaboration via a footnote at the end of this paragraph, that even
103. Cf Prakash, supra note 8; at 1177 ("Proponents of executive privilege have very little
pre-ratification evidence to support their cause.").
104. The relevant post-ratification incidents first were sketched by then Deputy Attorney
General William P. Rogers in a 1958 memorandum supporting executive privilege. William P.
Rogers, The Papers of the Executive Branch, 44 A.B.A.J. 941, 944 (1958); see also BERGER, supra note
18, at 163-64 (describing the Rogers memorandum and its influence). Raoul Berger responded
to the list of incidents, arguing that each incident fails to support a constitutional executive
privilege and in some cases supports the opposite conclusion. BERGER, supra note 18, at 163-
208. MarkJ. Rozell cited post-ratification activity in support of executive privilege in his book,
Executive Privilege. ROZELL, supra note 9, at 28-43. Saikrishna Prakash most recently echoed
Raoul Berger's points that post-ratification activity fails to support a constitutional executive
privilege and in some cases supports the opposite conclusion. Prakash, supra note 8, at 1177-85.
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if one deems post-ratification history a useful tool of constitutional
interpretation, the incidents cited in support of executive privilege are
inconclusive at best. Problems in the use of the cited incidents include the
conflation of arguments based on internal limits on Congress's investigative
powers with arguments based on external, executive privilege based
limitations; the fact that some cited incidents reflect only self-serving and
politically expedient positions taken by administration officials; and the fact
that some cited incidents demonstrate no more than the ability of the
executive and the legislature to reach political compromises with respect to
information requests, an ability inevitably important in information clashes
between the branches, regardless of the constitutional legitimacy of
executive privilege doctrine. 105
Executive privilege proponents also cite to statements from the framing
and ratifying generation that strongly suggest that the singular nature of
the Presidency partly reflects a desire to ensure such qualities as "secresy
[sic] ... dispatch ... vigor and energy,""'° qualities to which a multi-member
body would be much less conducive.'07 Alexander Hamilton and John Jay
famously referenced these presidential qualities in The Federalist Papers.
Hamilton, positing that "[e]nergy in the executive is a leading character in
the definition of good government," explained that "unity is conducive to
energy" because "[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally
characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree
than the proceedings of any greater number .... Jay spoke at length of
secrecy's advantages in the treaty-making context, stating:
105. For a discussion focusing solely on the three incidents involving the administration of
George Washington, given the more problematic nature of history relatively distant from the
ratification period, see Prakash, supra note 8, at 1184-85. The first incident is one in which
George Washington disclosed all information, albeit after it apparently was opined at a cabinet
meeting that the President should refuse to disclose any papers that would injure the public.
See, e.g., id. at 1177-79; Rogers, supra note 104, at 944. The second incident is one in which
cabinet members again opined that the President should refuse to disclose information as the
public interest demands and in which the President did withhold some information from the
Senate, but in which the Senate freely accepted these limitations. The incident thus was
resolved in a manner that avoided questions as to whether senatorial acquiescence should occur
as a matter of constitutional necessity or of political compromise. See, e.g., HOFFMAN, supra note
1, at 104-18; ROZELL, supra note 9, at 30-31; Prakash, supra note 8, at 1179-80. The third
incident, in which George Washington refused to disclose information sought by the House of
Representatives about a treaty, involved no executive privilege claim but rather a claim that the
House is internally limited by the scope of its constitutional powers. Indeed, Washington
suggested that he would have turned over the requested information were impeachment at
issue, thus suggesting that the House was limited only by the scope of its internal powers and
not by executive privilege. BERGER, supra note 18, at 172-73; Prakash, supra note 8, at 1181-83.
106. 1 THE REcoRDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 112 (Max Farrand, ed., Yale
Univ. Press 1966); see also id. at 70.
107. See, e.g., id., at 111-12.
108. THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 75, at 423-24.
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It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of whatever
nature, but that perfect secrecy and immediate dispatch are
sometimes requisite.... [T] here doubtless are many ... who would
rely on the secrecy of the President, but who would not confide in
that of the Senate, and still less in that of a large popular
assembly. 09
As noted earlier, Prakash helpfully puts such statements in perspective,
observing that the statements explain only an "attribute[] of a single
executive, not that the executive has a constitutional right to exercise that
attribute.' Prakash's insight is an important one. Moreover, careful analysis
of these statements and their respective contexts betrays not only their lack
of support for a constitutional executive privilege, but also their support for
keeping presidential secrecy shallow and politically checkable given the
President's special capacity for secrecy and the importance of keeping the
President under substantial public and congressional oversight generally.
That the relevant Federalist Papers support, rather than detract from
the argument for shallow and politically checkable secrecy is discussed
further in Part III.B.3.c. For purposes of the instant Part, it suffices to note
that the sparse historical evidence mustered in favor of a constitutional
executive privilege fails to support the privilege.
2. Article I, Article II, Functional Balancing, and Judicial Restraint
References in Articles I and II to the nature of the legislative power and
the executive power also provide no clear answers as to the constitutional
status of executive privilege. On the one hand, Prakash's analysis of the
President's dependence on the legislature is very important because it
demonstrates that the President is meant to be highly constrained by the
legislature. Surely, such a constrained figure lacks a categorical right to
choose the precise means through which he shall execute the law and serve
as Commander-in-Chief. On the other hand, Prakash's argument does not
fully address the sometimes murky line between what it is to legislate the
scope of presidential power and what it is to execute the law. In terms of
information control, it seems that one can credibly argue both that such
control is a facet of Congress's power to pass legislation "carrying into
Execution" presidential power," 2 and that once the legislature has given
tasks to the executive to effectuate, information control falls within the
President's power to effectuate such tasks (e.g., to execute the law)." 3
109. THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (John Jay), supra note 76, at 392.
110. Prakash, supra note 8, at 1176.
111. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
112. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
113. Cf Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733-34 (1986) ("[O]nce Congress makes its choice
in enacting legislation, its participation ends. Congress can thereafter control the execution of
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Furthermore, Prakash's examples of constraints on presidential power
involve appropriations or powers otherwise enumerated or strongly implied
to be legislative by constitutional text. 1 4 While these examples illuminate
how constrained the President is meant to be, they do not necessarily resolve
the question of to whom information control belongs. A similar point might
be made about Raoul Berger's discussion of Congress's oversight role
relative to presidential power.•5
Without more, then, arguments as to the respective natures of Article I
and Article II powers could lead one to conclude that information control
falls within a "zone of twilight" between executive and legislature,11 6 and that
inter-branch tugs of war regarding such control are best resolved on case by
case bases through functional balancing tests or treated as political
questions. Furthermore, on a practical note, much existing doctrine and
scholarship embraces the notion of implied presidential powers and
privileges." 7 It is thus important to demonstrate that information control is
different than other tools of power and that it cannot constitute an implied
presidential power or privilege even if such powers and privileges exist.
3. The Role of Information Control's Constitutional Significance
Starting from the assumption that tugs of war as to implied presidential
powers often are resolved best through functional balancing or as political
questions, it becomes important to consider whether information control is
different from other tools of power in a way that directs a unique conclusion
about it. In fact, information and information control have very special
constitutional significance. Reliance on openness as an operative norm and
faith in openness as a democratic salve can be detected throughout the
Constitution. Specifically, constitutional text and structure suggest a faith in
openness between the political branches and between such branches and
the people. At the same time, constitutional structure, text, and history also
suggest an understanding that government secrecy sometimes is a necessary
evil. Ultimately, text, structure, and history suggest that the means of
its enactment only indirectly.... ."); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637
(1952) (Jackson,J., concurring) (referring to "zone of twilight" in which "distribution [of power
between President and Congress] is uncertain").
114. See Prakash, supra note 8, at 1154-64. While Prakash's last example, that of "Creating
Officers and Departments," is not explicitly listed in Article I, Section 8, the legislative nature of
any such creation is strongly implied by the related necessity to appropriate funds and by
references in the Appointments Clause to the establishment "by Law" of "Officers of the United
States." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
115. Berger seems implicitly to recognize this point in suggesting that information control
disputes should be resolved judicially. See supra note 79.
116. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson,J., concurring).
117. See, e.g., supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. v. Nixon); supra
note 70 and accompanying text (citing scholarly arguments supporting a qualified executive
privilege); see also, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 748-58 (1982).
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reconciling these points is to ensure that any government secrecy remain a
politically controllable tool of the people and their representatives.
Specifically, text, structure, and history suggest that, to keep government
secrecy within the ultimate control of the people, and hence non-tyrannical,
the very fact of such secrecy must remain shallow and politically checkable.
4. Elaboration on the Shallow/Deep Secrecy Distinction and
Its Constitutional Relevance
As noted earlier, this Article uses the phrase "shallow and politically
checkable" as shorthand for the status that the Constitution demands of
political branch secrecy.11 8 This status is one of subordination to legislative
openness requirements. Such subordination equates to shallowness and
political checkability in the two senses described earlier: It subjects secrecy
to policies that themselves are open, and it subjects specific secrets to the
possibility of being made shallow or even revealed through such policies'
effectuation.
Another way to understand this point is to envision secrecy as
encompassing a spectrum of categories that includes very shallow, minimally
shallow, minimally deep, and very deep. Subordinating secrecy to broader
openness legislation keeps secrecy "shallow and politically checkable" by
creating conditions conducive to "minimally shallow" and "very shallow"
secrecy and antagonistic to "minimally deep" and "very deep" secrecy. A very
shallow secret is a secret, the existence and basic nature of which are known,
even if the precise information that comprises the secret itself is not
disclosed. An example of a very shallow secret is the content of the Nixon
White House tapes: as noted earlier, the tapes' existence came to light due
to congressional testimony by former presidential aide Alexander
Butterfield." 9 Between the time that the fact of the tapes was disclosed and
the tapes themselves were released, the tapes were a very shallow secret.
Another example of a very shallow secret is the August 6, 2001 Presidential
Daily Briefing ("PDB") that was the subject of much public, congressional,
and agency speculation prior to its declassification. The PDB first was sought
unsuccessfully by the Joint Inquiry before ultimately being disclosed to the
9/11 Commission and declassified. The general subject matter of the PDB-
the possibility of an airline hijacking masterminded by Osama Bin Laden-
was known prior to its disclosure. Before its disclosure, then, the PDB was a
very shallow secret. 1
°
There is some overlap between the next two points on the spectrum:
minimally shallow secrecy and minimally deep secrecy. Both might be
characterized as states of affair in which the existence of at least some secrets
118. See supra page 105-07.
119. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Dean, supra note 45; Isikoff & Hosenball, supra note 45; Strohm, supra note 38.
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is not known or easily discoverable, but in which the policy of secrecy itself is
known. From this perspective, the distinction between minimally shallow
secrecy and minimally deep secrecy is one of degree, as measured by the
extent to which certain factors are present or absent. These factors include:
(1) the high visibility of secrecy policies; (2) the relatively easy ability to alter
secrecy policies through political channels; and (3) the relatively easy ability
to effectuate policies of openness (e.g., the relatively easy ability on the part
of the public to invoke public access statutes or on the part of
congresspersons to invoke statutory investigative authority).
A state of very deep secrecy is one in which even secrecy policies
generally are unknown.
The imprecision of the term "shallow secrecy" necessarily complicates
the meaning of the statement that government secrecy should be "shallow
and politically checkable." A more precise way to frame the point is that the
apparatus for information control between the branches should be such as
to funnel information, to the extent possible, into a state of minimal to very
shallow secrecy and away from a state of minimal to very deep secrecy. This
suggests, again, that statutory policies of openness against the executive
branch should be final as a constitutional matter and thus enforceable with
relative ease and reliability. This point is elaborated on in Part IV. As a
foundational matter, however, Part B explores the constitutional bases of the
argument that political secrecy should be "shallow and politically
checkable," meaning that it should exist within a framework that facilitates
minimal to very shallow secrecy and protects against minimal to very deep
secrecy.
B. THE CONSTITTIOAAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE ARGUMFIT FOR
SHAL1.OWAND POUITICALLY CHECKABLE SECRECY
1. Openness as the Presumptive Constitutional Norm in Inter-Branch and
Government-Populace Relations
a. Popular Sovereig-nty
The provision of direct popular sovereignty for the House of
Representatives and a framework for indirect popular sovereignty for the
Senate and the President in the original Constitution suggest the necessity of
presumptive openness in government.121 Popular sovereignty would not have
much meaning without a norm of openness as to governors' activities,
without which governors could easily manipulate the people through
information control. Indeed, Charles Black has argued that free information
flow is so crucial to the Constitution's structure that free speech would have
121. U.S. CONST. art. I,§2, cl. 1;id. art. I,§3, cl. 1;id. art. II,§1,cl. 2-3.
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to be protected even if the First Amendment did not exist.122 That popular
sovereignty must mean informed popular sovereignty is suggested also by
the philosophical premises that underscore popular control. As Mark
Fenster notes, sentiments favoring government transparency can be found
"in the classic liberalism of Locke, Mill, and Rousseau, in both Benthamite
utilitarian philosophy and Kantian moral philosophy."
123
While the original Constitution did not provide for direct popular
control in the case of the Senate and the President, it provided for indirect
popular control in both cases, with state legislatures picking Senators and
directing the means of choosing electors to select the President. Founding
era statements assume that this framework is one of ultimate popular control
for each federal branch. 124 Alexander Hamilton, writing in Federalist 84,
evinced this assumption and combined it with further assumptions to the
effect that government information would flow freely between the federal
government, state legislators with direct responsibility for electing Senators
and for choosing the means of presidential elector selection, and the
populace responsible for electing House members and state legislators.
Hamilton notes:
The executive and legislative bodies of each State will be so many
sentinels over the persons employed in every department of the
national administration; and as it will be in their power to adopt
and pursue a regular and effectual system of intelligence, they can
never be at a loss to know the behavior of those who represent their
constituents in the national councils, and can readily communicate
the same knowledge to the people. Their disposition to apprise the
community of whatever may prejudice its interests from another
quarter may be relied upon, if it were only from the rivalship of
125power.
Reflecting an understanding of government openness as a precondition of
popular sovereignty more generally, Hamilton also envisioned a messenger
role for citizens who lived closest to state capitols:
It ought also to be remembered that the citizens who inhabit the
country at and near the seat of government will, in all questions
122. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 35-51
(1969).
123. Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 895-96 (2006) (internal
citations omitted); see also HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 11-13.
124. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 75, at 429
(referring to popular control over the President); 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra note 106, at 49-50 (referring to James Madison as an "advocate for the
policy of refining the popular appointments by successive filtrations"); id. at 359 (noting that
John Rutlidge "could not admit the solidity of the distinction between a mediate & immediate
election by the people").
125. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 516-17 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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that affect the general liberty and prosperity, have the same interest
with those who are at a distance, and that they will stand ready to
sound the alarm when necessary, and to point out the actors in any
pernicious project. The public papers will be expeditious
messengers of intelligence to the most remote inhabitants of the
Union.12
The evolution within the United States toward direct, rather than
indirect, popular sovereignty further strengthens the argument for
presumptive government openness. Senators have been elected directly by
the people since the Seventeenth Amendment was ratified in 1913.' v And
while the electoral college still exists, "the states (working in conjunction
with political parties) have all (more or less) effectively constrained their
electoral college members to follow a popular presidential vote in the
state."1
28
b. The First Amendment
If Charles Black is correct and protection for free speech is implicit in
constitutional structure, 29 the existence of the First Amendment
nonetheless accentuates the importance of free information flow to the
Constitution's design. The point is not that the First Amendment provides a
direct means to access the information at issue in executive privilege claims.
As I have suggested elsewhere, the First Amendment, while providing direct
access to some government information, generally does not provide access
to the type of information at issue in executive privilege disputes. ' The
point rather is that the First Amendment is further evidence that the
Constitution strongly values free information flow as a presumptive norm in
a system based on self-government. Such evidence, like other constitutional
indicia of this norm, impacts our understanding of information control
between the branches, including of Congress's ability to control presidential
secret-keeping.
Indeed, the First Amendment's text, particularly its broad free speech
and free press clauses, and its explicit protection for petitioning the
government, evinces a presumptive embrace of free information flow as part
of self-government's structure. This intuitive reading of text is bolstered also
by reference to widely accepted tenets of free speech theory. As I have
126. Id. at 517.
127. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
128. Robert W. Bennett, Democracy as Meaningful Conversation, 14 CONST. COMM. 481, 515
(1997).
129. See supra note 122.
130. See Kitrosser, supra note 14, at 102-12.
131. Id. at 99-100, 130-36 (arguing that significant First Amendment access rights should
not attach to proceedings or information that roughly could be deemed "political" in nature).
92 IOWA LA WREVIEW
elaborated elsewhere, the ability of the people to oversee and to check their
governors is "at least an important part of the justification for free
speech. 132 This is a point widely accepted throughout free speech case law
and scholarship. 13 3 Indeed, it is from this premise that the Supreme Court
reached the insight that the First Amendment embodies limited rights to
access government information." The point, again, is not that the First
Amendment is a direct source of access to the information at issue in most
executive privilege disputes. But understanding that government secrecy in
some cases can so undermine the preconditions of free speech as to violate
the First Amendment highlights the constitutional presumption of openness
as an operative norm. This presumption, again, is of no small importance in
interpreting the Constitution's structural directives as to information control
between the political branches.
c. The Public, Dialogic Nature of the Legislative, Treaty-Approval,
and Nomination Processes
Finally, the relatively public and dialogic nature of the legislative, treaty-
approval, and nomination processes again reflects a Constitution built on a
presumptive faith in openness and dialogue between the political branches
and between those branches and the people. As Laura Fitzgerald has
observed, analysis of these processes reveals federal political branches
structured around mutual obligations "to speak and to listen" to one
another. 135 Furthermore, this information flow is expected to find its way to
the people.
136
With respect to the legislative process, the Constitution requires that a
majority of the House of Representatives and of the Senate approve a bill.13
This requirement exists against a general expectation of deliberation and
138relative openness in the proceedings of the House and the Senate.
132. Id. at 128; see also id. at 126 (introducing self-government and government "checking"
theories of free speech value, the former most closely associated with Alexander Meiklejohn
and the latter with Vincent Blasi).
133. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95, 101-02 (1940); Kitrosser, supra note 14,
at 126-29 (arguing that self-government and its underlying theoretical premises form part of
virtually every major theory of free-speech value); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is
an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 256, 263 (1961).
134. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596, 603-
05 (1982).
135. Laura Fitzgerald, Cadenced Power: The Kinetic Constitution, 46 DUKE L.J. 679, 767 (1997);
see also id. at 761-67.
136. See id. at 761-67.
137. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
138. The requirement in Article I, section 5, clause 3 that "[elach House shall keep a
Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same" pardy exemplifies this
expectation, though the clause allows Congress to exempt "such parts as may in theirJudgment
require Secrecy." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. The pre-founding perception of openness in state
and federal legislatures and the founders' apparent understanding of a very limited scope for
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Furthermore, once each chamber approves a bill, the bill must be shared
with the President who concurs and signs the legislation or who, if he
disagrees, not only must return the legislation to the chamber in which it
originated but must do so "with his Objections.' 3 9 The relationship of this
requirement to the process' public nature is particularly clear in light of the
mandate that the relevant chamber "enter the Objections at large on their
Journal." 40 Furthermore, the President's objections ultimately must be
shared with both congressional chambers and the bill becomes law only if
two-thirds of each chamber, again against a presumptive backdrop of
dialogue and relative openness, approves it.' 4' In a final nod to the process'
public nature, "the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and
Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be
entered on the Journal of each House respectively.
"0 4 2
While the procedures for making treaties and appointing public
officials are less elaborate and inclusive than the legislative process, the
Constitution nonetheless ensures that these processes are multilateral and
contain dialogue-driven checks. The President may only make treaties with
the "Advice and Consent of the Senate" and with the concurrence of "two
thirds of the Senators present."143 And while he may nominate
"Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme
Court, and all other Officers of the United States," he may appoint the same
only with the "Advice and Consent of the Senate.' 144 These provisions not
only incorporate dual-branch review and concurrence, but explicitly require
dialogue and consultation in the form of "Advice," much like the dialogue-
infused requirements for legislating.
Alexander Hamilton emphasized the positive impact on public
knowledge of the shared role between the Senate and the President in
appointments. Hamilton explained:
[A]s there would be a necessity of submitting each nomination to
the judgment of an entire branch of the legislature, the
circumstances attending an appointment, from the mode of
conducting it, would naturally become matters of notoriety, and
the public would be at no loss to determine what part had been
performed by the different actors.
145
the secrecy exception of Article I, Section 5, Clause 3 further evidence this expectation. See, e.g.,
HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 28-29, 35-38.
139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
140. Id. Thejournal is, of course, presumptively public. See supra note 138.
141. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
142. Id.
143. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
144. Id.
145. THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 461 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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Equally striking is Hamilton's negative portrayal of the comparatively insular
nature of officer nominations in the state of New York and the resulting
impact on public knowledge:
The council of appointment consists of from three to five persons,
of whom the governor is always one. This small body, shut up in a
private apartment, impenetrable to the public eye, proceed to the
execution of the trust committed to them. It is known that the
governor claims the right of nomination upon the strength of some
ambiguous expressions in the Constitution; but it is not known to
what extent, or in what manner he exercises it; nor upon what
occasions he is contradicted or opposed. The censure of a bad
appointment, on account of the uncertainty of its author and for
want of a determinate object, has neither poignancy nor
duration.146
Hamilton drew like conclusions regarding the shared Senate-
presidential role in treaty formation. In addition to the advantages of the
"numbers and characters of those who are to make [treaties,]" Hamilton
noted that any misbehavior by the Executive surely would be reported by the
Senate to the people: "the usual propensity of human nature will warrant us
in concluding that there would be commonly no defect of inclination in the
body to divert the public resentment from themselves by a ready sacrifice of
the authors of their mismanagement and disgrace."
147
Discussing the shared nature of legislative power, James Madison
similarly emphasized the connection between power sharing, dialogue, and
the knowledge and ultimate control of the people. Madison explained, for
example, that before the Senate could cause a revolution based on
corruption, "the Senate ... must in the first place corrupt itself; must next
corrupt the State legislatures, must then corrupt the House of
Representatives, and must finally corrupt the people at large."
48
2. The Need for Occasional Secrecy
Of course, not every aspect of government activity can or should be fully
open to the public. Government secrecy is often, but certainly not always,
bad policy. 49 The Constitution's framers recognized and provided for
occasional needs that might arise for government secrecy. With the myriad
ways in which constitutional structure reflects a need for and philosophy of
openness, however, it is striking how relatively minute support for
government secrecy, let alone executive branch secrecy, is in the
146. Id.
147. THE FEDERALIST No. 66, at 407 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
148. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 388 (James Madison (cited by Rossiter as "Probably
Madison")) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
149. See infra Part V.
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Constitution. This Part discusses the two major ways in which the
Constitution reflects some need for and expectation of government secrecy.
This Section also discusses the fact that the Constitution itself was drafted in
secret. Part III.B.3 elaborates further on each example and explains that
each example reflects no more than a constitutional embrace of shallow and
politically checkable secrecy.
The Constitution's only textual reference to secrecy occurs in Article I,
section 5, clause 3, which states that:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time
to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their
Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members
of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of
those Present, be entered on the Journal.
150
Hence, each Chamber's journal/openness requirement is juxtaposed with
discretion to circumvent the requirement when the relevant Chamber
deems it necessary.
While there is no textual mention of executive branch secrecy,
founding era statements suggest that the singular nature of the Presidency
partly reflects a desire to ensure such qualities as "secresy [sic] . .
dispatch . . .vigor and energy,"15 ' qualities to which a multi-member body
would be less conducive.152 Alexander Hamilton and John Jay famously
reference these presidential qualities in The Federalist Papers, as noted above
and as discussed further below.
153
Finally, it bears noting that the Constitution itself was drafted in
secret.154 The Philadelphia Convention in which the Constitution was
drafted adopted a rule of secrecy covering the convention proceedings.
5
The rule of secrecy was the source of some controversy and debate both
within and beyond the convention walls.1 56 Thomas Jefferson famously
lamented the secrecy rule, stating, "I am sorry they began their deliberations
by so abominable a precedent as that of tying up the tongues of their
150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
151. See, e.g., 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 106, at 112 (quoting
George Mason: "[T]he chief advantages which have been urged in favor of unity in the
Executive, are the secresy [sic], the dispatch, the vigor and energy . . ."); id. at 70 (quoting
James Wilson to similar effect).
152. See, e.g., id. at 111-12.
153. See supra Part III.A.1; infra Part 111.B.3.c.
154. See generally 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 106, at xi-xiv;
HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 20-24.
155. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret
Drafting Histoy, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1115 (2003).
156. See, e.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 106, at 18; 3 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 106, at 173-74, 190-91; HOFFMAN, supra note
1, at 20-24.
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members. [N]othing can justify this example but the innocence of their
intentions, & ignorance of the value of public discussions.' 5 7 Others insisted
that the secrecy rule was necessary. James Madison, for example, stated that
"No Constitution would ever have been adopted by the Convention if the
debates had been public. 1 5 ' And Alexander Hamilton insisted: "Had the
deliberations been open while going on, the clamours of faction would have
prevented any satisfactory result. Had they been afterwards disclosed
[during the ratification period], much food would have been afforded to
inflammatory declamation." 59 The members of the convention eventually
handed the convention notes over to George Washington, though they left
the ultimate decision as to publication or secrecy to "Congress, if ever
formed under the Constitution.""'° In 1818, Congress ordered the notes
printed for public release.' '
3. Reconciling the Two Elements:
Keeping Secrecy Shallow and Politically Checkable
a. The Logical Place of Shallow and Politically Checkable Secrecy
in Constitutional Structure
The Constitution's structural reliance on openness and its reflection of
the need for occasional secrecy can be reconciled through the realization
that secrecy is but a tool that government may use to effectuate its purposes.
Because it is a tool that poses unique dangers of being used tyrannically and
of being undiscoverable when so used, strenuous efforts must be made to
keep the tool within the sight of its ultimate owners, the people. The logical
means of keeping the tool so in check are mechanisms designed to help
ensure secrecy's shallowness and political checkability.
The remainder of this Part explains that the structural and historical
embraces of secrecy described in Part III.B.2 evince support for no more
and no less than shallow and politically checkable secrecy.
b. Article I, Section 5
Recall that the Constitution's only textual reference to secrecy is in
Article I, section 5, which states:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time
to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their
157. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 106, at 76.
158. HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 21.
159. Id.
160. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 106, at 648; accord 3 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 106, at 423-24, 425; Kesavan & Paulsen,
supranote 155, at 1115.
161. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 106, at xi-xii.
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Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members
of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of
those Present, be entered on the journal."6
What is most significant about this provision is not its acknowledgment of
the need for some government secrecy, nor even the bare fact that only
Congress is explicitly empowered to keep secrets.163 What makes this
provision so significant is that it suggests a choice to accord an explicit
secret-keeping power only to the branch that will logistically and politically
find it most difficult to keep secrets. Additionally, this power is couched as
an exception to a general norm of openness. This suggests an
understanding that when government secrecy occurs, it should be rare,
difficult to engage in, and sufficiently exceptional as to be detectible and,
hence, shallow.
Article I, section 5, clause 3 was framed against a backdrop of
presumptive legislative openness, as the Continental Congress had operated
in relative transparency for at least a decade by the time of the framing. As
Daniel Hoffman notes, "In principle, any information laid before Congress
was a matter of public record unless placed under specific injunction of
secrecy; and the votes and official acts of Congress were likewise, unless
entered in a separate secret journal reserved for matters of delicate
nature."' 64 Expectations of legislative openness were also reflected in the
controversy among the Philadelphia Convention-goers and in the
ratification process over Article I, section 5, clause 3. As Hoffman explains,
both proponents and opponents of the provision agreed that secrecy should
be "limited to the most highly sensitive military and diplomatic affairs; they
differed only as to whether the Constitution made this sufficiently clear.
1 65
And expectations of legislative openness also were borne out in practice: the
House of Representatives opened its proceedings to the public and the press
from a very early stage. 166 The Senate was more reticent and operated
behind closed doors for several years before ultimately giving in to political
pressure and opening its doors as well.
167
The very framing of the congressional secrecy provision as an exception
to an openness mandate, combined with the expectation that a large and
deliberative legislative body generally will operate in sunlight, suggests a
particular means of balancing any need for government secrecy against the
necessities of meaningful popular oversight and the dangers of government
162. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
163. But see BERGER, supra note 18, at 42 (relying on this textual exclusivity).
164. HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 14.
165. Id. at 37; see also id. at 28-29, 35-38; 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION,
supra note 106, at 260.
166. HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 48-50, 79.
167. Id. at 55-58, 60, 67-69, 81-83, 84-88.
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opacity. Specifically, these factors suggest a framework wherein final
decisions as to political secrecy are trusted only to bodies likely to face
internal and external pressures against such secrecy. Internal pressures are
more likely to be generated in an inherently deliberative body, such as the
legislature or a chamber thereof, than in an intrinsically insular body
characterized by a single person's capacity for unilateral action. And both
internal and external pressures are more likely to be generated where
secrecy is exceptional, where the body itself thus is likely to treat secret-
keeping as a consciously chosen course of action subject to debate, and
where the public is more likely to notice an exceptional instance of "door-
closing."
Article I, section 5, clause 3 thus by no means evinces blanket
constitutional approval of government secrecy. To the contrary, its status as
the only textual grant of secret-keeping power suggests that such power may
be appropriate only where conditions exist to facilitate shallow, rather than
deep, secrecy. Such conditions inhere where secrecy is relatively likely to
constitute a detectible policy choice and thus to be subject to debate
between political actors and between such actors and the people.
c. The Unitary Presidency
The notions of deep and shallow secrecy also provide a useful
conceptual framework for understanding the relationship between the
unitary presidency and government secrecy. As noted earlier, members of
the founding generation extolled the capacity for secret-keeping of a single
President. At the same time, they extolled the relative transparency, upon
investigation, of a single person's doings. This suggests a compromise
between the advantages of presidential secrecy and the risk of tyranny that
such secrecy poses: the President can use his unique capacity for secret-
keeping but such use must remain on a relatively short political leash.
As noted earlier, Alexander Hamilton famously stated that presidential
"[u]nity is conducive to energy" because "[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and
dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much
more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number .... 68
Yet Hamilton, in the same Federalist Paper in which he made this statement,
followed the statement with an approving explanation of the responsibility
and potential transparency of a unitary President. Hamilton argued that
"multiplication of the executive adds to the difficulty of detection,"
including the "opportunity of discovering [misconduct] with facility and
clearness." One person "will be more narrowly watched and most readily
suspected."1 69
168. THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 75, at 424.
169. Id. at 427-30.
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Similar observations were made at the Philadelphia Convention'7" and
during the ratification period." ' For example, William Davie explained in
the North Carolina ratification debate:
With respect to the unity of the Executive, the superior energy and
secrecy wherewith one person can act, was one of the principles on
which the Convention went. But a more predominant principle
was, the more obvious responsibility of one person. It was observed
that, if there were a plurality of persons, and a crime should be
committed, when their conduct was to be examined, it would be
impossible to fix the fact on any one of them, but that the public
were never at a loss when there was but one man.
1 2
Discussions of the unitary President's responsibility and potential
transparency are subsets of more general observations regarding checks and
balances on presidential power and their impact on intra-governmental
information sharing and public knowledge. Such checks and balances
include the President's ultimate dependence on the people and the
contingency of most presidential action on congressional oversight and
approval. The safety that inheres in these checks was observed by the
founders, particularly in contrasting the limited and dependent power of
the President with the boundless power of monarchs.
7 3
John Jay tied the notion of shared power to intra-governmental and
public oversight in his discussion, cited earlier, of the treaty power.' After
referring approvingly to the President's capacity for secrecy during treaty
negotiations,17 5 Jay dismissed concerns about corruption, deeming it
improbable "that the President and two thirds of the Senate will ever be
capable of such unworthy conduct. ' ' 76 Jay further reassures that "in such a
case, if it should ever happen, the treaty so obtained from us would, like all
other fraudulent contracts, be null and void by the law of nations."'7 7 Finally,
should all other safeguards fail, Jay explains that "motive to good behavior is
amply afforded by the article on the subject of impeachments."17 8 Jay's
references to senatorial, bi-cameral (through impeachment), and
international oversight assume a capacity on the part of those with oversight
170. See, e.g., 1 THE RECORDSOFTHE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 106, at 74, 254.
171. See, e.g., HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 29-32.
172. Id. at 30 (quoting 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 106, at
347).
173. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 415-23 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961); cf, e.g., 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 106, at 70-71, 85-
87, 98-105.
174. See supra text accompanying note 109.
175. See supra Part III.B.2.
176. THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (John Jay), supra note 76, at 395.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 396.
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power to uncover information relating to possible presidential corruption in
the treaty-making process. Furthermore, insofar as Jay connects senatorial
and presidential incentives for good behavior with the possibility of public
rebuke, citing concerns about "honor," "reputations," and "disgrace," 179 he
assumes that an investigating and punishing Congress can make damaging
information public and that this possibility will incentivize good behavior.
This is consistent with Alexander Hamilton's observation, noted earlier, that
the Senate will not hesitate to shift public blame to the President for
problems in the making of treaties.1
80
As exemplified by Jay's discussion, general assurances regarding
popular oversight of the President and the shared nature of political power
encompass assumptions that presidential secrecy powers must be subject to
questioning and line drawing by Congress. These assumptions similarly are
encompassed in observations regarding the heightened responsibility and
potential transparency of the unitary presidency. In short, the founders
acknowledged the President's capacity for secret keeping and saw such
capacity as an advantageous, even necessary, trait. But they similarly
recognized the capacity for abuse inherent in such power and appeared to
assume that congressional oversight would keep such capacity under tight
political control by threatening to expose the existence or even content of
secrets.
d. Constitutional Convention Secrecy
It also is interesting to note that the secrecy of the Constitution's
drafting,"' though hardly a high point in the history of open government,
approaches the conditions for secrecy described in this Part and thus is
largely consistent with the limited embrace of shallow, checkable secrecy
suggested by Article I, Section 5. Certainly, the Philadelphia Convention was
a deliberative forum. And as noted earlier, the imposition of secrecy was
subject to debate both within and beyond the convention walls.B 2
Furthermore, those who ratified the Constitution were aware of its secret
drafting history and had the opportunity to reject the Constitution on that
basis."'
179. Id.
180. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
181. For a general discussion of the Constitution's secret drafting history, see, e.g.,
HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 20-24; 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 106,
at xi-xiv; Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 155, at 1115.
182. See, e.g., HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 20-24; 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra note 106, at 18; 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note
106, at 173-74,190-91.
183. See, e.g., 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 106, at 173-74, 191;
HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 20-24.
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The secrecy in which the Constitution was drafted also suggests another
lesson relevant to executive privilege doctrine. Specifically, the secret
drafting of a document so steeped in openness principles may simply reflect
a fact of human nature-the frequent divide between what people profess
and what they do. This point is further demonstrated by histoical misuses
and abuses of executive branch secrecy.184 This observation of course is
reflected in the rules-based nature of the Constitution, in its embrace of
government openness as a general rule, and in its limited embrace of
secrecy as a politically controllable tool. Daniel Hoffman puts the lesson
well, explaining:
[T] he reticence of the framers can be viewed in light of their hope
to design a system that would win acceptance and function
properly in spite of the shortcomings of those who created it and
those who would succeed them .... [T]he Founding Fathers were
eminently realistic about the temptations to which political man is
subject, and they claimed no personal immunity. The genius of
constitutionalism lay in its honest confrontation of such realities
and its attempt to contain them by resort to checks and balances,
fair procedures, and public accountability. The merit of the
framers' design deserves to be judged without reference to the
impurities of personal motives or the vicissitudes of the negotiating
process. Moreover, even if the secrecy of the convention reflected
an antidemocratic bias on the framers' part, they did not offer the
convention itself as a model for the new government. On the
contrary, one principle they tried to build into the constitutional
design was the very one to which Jefferson had appealed [in his
criticism of Convention secrecy]: government not by mystique but
by laws made with the informed consent of the governed.1
85
184. See supra Part I; infra Part VI.
185. HOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 23. A similar point can be drawn from the example of
Alexander Hamilton, who embraced a substantially broader view of presidential power post-
ratification as a member of the Washington administration than he had embraced in his careful
pre-ratification separation of powers analyses. Compare supra notes 146-147 and accompanying
text and notes 168-169 and accompanying text (discussing Hamilton's pre-ratification views of
presidential power), with Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 27 (2004) (discussing
Hamilton's views as George Washington's Secretary of State and quoting James Madison's
warning that, under Hamilton's post-ratification "interpretation of executive power . . . 'no
citizen could any longer guess at the character of the government under which he lives'").
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IV. IMPLEMENTING THE SOLUTION:
THE CONSTITUTIONALLY CONCLUSIVE NATURE OF
STATUTORY OPENNESS REQUIREMENTS
A. LEGISLATIVE AcCESS DECISIONS AS THE PRACTICAL MANIFESTATION OF THE
SHALLOW/POLITICALLY CHECKABLE SECRECY SOLuTIoN
If the theoretical reconciliation of constitutional openness and secrecy
values is the notion of shallow and politically checkable secrecy, the practical
manifestation of that reconciliation is allowing the executive to operate in
secret but subjecting such operation to any checks authorized through the
legislative process. The statutory process itself thus would be conclusive of
any Article II concerns, and any judicial enforcement provided by statute
• 186
would be appropriate. As discussed in Part I, three major types of checks
can be authorized. First, Congress can pass statutes granting the public
access rights to categories of executive branch information. Second,
Congress can pass statutes giving itself and its committees and
subcommittees subpoena power, subject to contempt penalties, to seek
information from the executive branch.1s 7 Third, Congress can create
agencies similarly empowered to demand information from the executive
branch.
The statutory process is the most intuitive means to subject presidential
secrecy to a public process of political questioning and consideration. As
discussed earlier, the legislative process is designed to ensure relative
openness and deliberation among the political branches and between those
branches and the people. The legislative process thus places the parameters
of openness mandates and debate about them in the sunlight, even as the
policies themselves permit some secrecy.
While the legislative process constitutes a meta-level on which broad
access policies are formulated, the policies so created then generate a
second level of activity through which executive secrecy is overseen more
directly. Thus, individuals can vindicate congressional openness policies by
seeking specific pieces of information through statutes such as the FACA, 88
186. This is distinct from deeming executive privilege claims political questions. Were such
claims political questions, the judiciary would neither enforce statutorily based information
demands nor deem them unconstitutional. Instead, the judiciary would leave each side to its
own political devices to resolve such matters. Of course, there also is the theoretical possibility
that Congress will invoke inherent, rather than statutory power to demand information. See, e.g.,
Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 225-34 (1821). Congress has not, however, invoked such power
in many years and non-statutory information demands are beyond this Article's scope. See supra
note 47.
187. There remains an issue as to whether Congress can require U.S. Attorneys to bring
criminal suits under a criminal contempt statute. See Peterson, supra note 47, at 574-612. This
issue is well beyond this Article's scope, but to the extent that such suits are brought, any
executive privilege claims made in response should not prevail.
188. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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and congressional committees, subcommittees, and legislatively empowered
agencies similarly can vindicate such policies through their investigations.
This second level of activity serves two purposes. First, to the extent that it
uncovers the information sought or even makes public the very search for
such information, such activity furthers the process of checking executive
branch secrecy in the manner prescribed by the empowering statute. The
second purpose served stems from the fact that, given the President's
capacity for secrecy, executive branch secrets are likely to exist in layers, with
some secrets buried under other secrets. Given the layering of secrets, the
capacity for a robust degree of second-level activity is important if legislative
openness policies are to be vindicated. This is so because such activity is
needed to illuminate information and also to strip away layers that keep
some secrets deep rather than shallow. Perhaps the most famous example of
such stripping of layers is the revelation of the Watergate tapes' existence. It
was only through its capacity to question former presidential aide Alexander
Butterfield that the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities discovered the tapes' existence in the first place. Once the tapes
became a shallow rather than a deep secret, further legal and political
maneuvering could take place in an effort to discover their content.
18 9
Of course, this Article does not claim, nor could it claim, that all
presidential secrets will remain deep or that all sought after information will
remain undisclosed unless legislative access decisions are deemed
constitutionally conclusive and enforceable. To the contrary, under the
current system, whereby executive privilege claims often are resolved
through informal political channels but also can be subject to judicial
balancing, one can find any number of secrets that eventually were disclosed
or made shallow. For example, the NEPDG information that Vice President
Cheney has refused to disclose itself is a well-publicized, shallow secret in
light of the legal and political battles over it.' 9° And the August 6, 2001
Presidential Daily Briefing, sought unsuccessfully by the 9/11 Joint Inquiry,
became a fairly well-publicized, shallow secret through the political tussling
over it. 91 Additionally, the PDB eventually was disclosed, albeit to a different
investigating body (the 9/11 Commission), long after it first was sought.192
Yet it remains important to deem statutory access requirements the final
word in the face of executive privilege claims because constitutional
principles demand it and, more concretely, because such status allows for
the creation of a comprehensive and reliable framework to keep executive
secrecy shallow and politically checkable. As a practical matter, the most
obvious result of such status would be an increased likelihood that legislative
189. See supra notes 15-16.
190. See, e.g., supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
191. See supra text accompanying note 120.
192. Id.
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access mandates will be invoked, complied with, and ultimately enforced in
the face of any challenges. Indeed, as highlighted through examples cited
earlier in this Article, the mere possibility of a judicial conflict can
discourage access demands.193  Such discouragement is particularly
significant in light of the layering of secret information. Even the tempering
of information demands can impact the depth of information sought or
uncovered.
Furthermore, it is theoretically significant to accord legislative access
decisions constitutionally final and enforceable status. The according of
such status could highlight the underlying logic outlined throughout this
paper: that executive privilege clashes fundamentally are policy debates
about the merits of secrecy versus openness, that constitutional structure
suggests that skepticism as to pro-secrecy arguments is called for, and that
constitutional structure ultimately militates toward resolving such policy
debates through legislation to ensure stable political mechanisms to keep
secrecy shallow and politically checkable. Among other things, such a
theoretical statement might help stem a problematic shadow function
played by judicial balancing tests and their underlying rationales: that of
fodder for executive branch advocacy of secrecy without any serious debate
about the rationales' questionable and constitutionally counterintuitive
nature. 194
B. THE PROTECTIVE NATURE OF STA TUTES ' RELATIVE BREADTH AND OF THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
The sufficiency of the legislative process both for keeping presidential
secrecy shallow and politically checkable and for safeguarding any public
interest in presidential secrecy is further exemplified by considering the
protections of the legislative process in combination with the relative
breadth of statutes.
As for the legislative process, the importance of its open, deliberative
nature for keeping secrecy shallow and politically checkable while
facilitating consideration of any public interests in secrecy has already been
discussed. 195 It also is important to keep in mind the role of presidential
participation in the process to further safeguard any public interests in
secrecy. Of course, the President must sign legislation for it to become law,
unless Congress and the public deem the legislation sufficiently important to
override any presidential veto with a two-thirds majority vote.196 The latter
occurred in the case of the 1974 FOIA Amendments that imposed de novo
judicial review over executive branch determinations that information is
193. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
194. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
195. See supra Part III.B. 1.c.
196. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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"properly classified." 197 And while much anecdotal evidence suggests that the
public generally is wary of government secrecy,' 98 the President is hardly at a
loss for rhetorical tools in public debates over access versus secrecy. Indeed,
polling suggests that when access debates are framed as matters of national
security, public support for openness drops.' 99 Furthermore, observers note
that self-serving presidential secrecy readily gets conflated with national
security based secrecy." ° That the statutory process adequately protects any
Article II interests is highlighted further when one considers the
arduousness of the process and the fact that constitutional values militate in
favor of placing any errors on the side of openness rather than secrecy in
any event.
Also important is the breadth of access statutes. By their nature, statutes
tend to be broad relative to their case-by-case implementation or
enforcement. As noted above, the legislative process constitutes a meta-level
on which policy decisions about secrecy and openness are made, while the
use of any statutory authorizations constitute a second level on which
particular instances of secrecy are checked actively. The meta-level decisions,
or statutes, will vary in their breadth. Arguably, the broadest statutes are
those that grant all congressional committees subpoena power and the
power to enforce subpoenas through criminal contempt actions upon the
majority vote of a congressional chamber.20 ' Public access statutes that
specify categories of accessible information at varying levels of detail °2 and
statutory authorizations for specific agencies with specific missions to use
and enforce subpoeanas are both typically narrower in scope.203
Statutory breadth is particularly important in bolstering protections for
openness interests. While the President certainly has rhetorical tools to
argue for secrecy even in broad policy debates, history and logic nonetheless
suggest that Presidents, and politicians generally, will be more inclined and
politically pressured to support openness as a relatively abstract value rather
than as applied to particular situations. Hence, Presidents sometimes
articulate broad support for policies of openness while deviating from such
197. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b) (1) (B), (a) (4) (B) (2000); Deyling, supra note 67, at 74-76.
198. See, e.g., Kitrosser, supra note 14, at 137-39; Noah Shactman, Secrecy Suddenly a
Campaign Issue, WIRED NEWS, Jan. 17, 2004, available at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/
0,1283,61952,00.html.
199. See The Bush Administration's Secrecy Policy: A Call to Action to Protect Democratic Values, Oct.
25, 2002, available at http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/ 1145/1/253.
200. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., WAR AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 63 (2004);
SCHLESINGER, supra note 4, at 356; Mary-Rose Papandrea, Under Attack: The Public's Right to Know
and the War on Terror, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 35, 76-80 (2005); Wells, supra note 5, at 1197-
1209; Senate Panel Holds Secrecy Hearings, CNN, Mar. 25, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/
2005/ALLPOLITICS/03/15/congress.foia.ap/index.html.
201. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., supra note 28 and accompanying text.
203. See, e.g., supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
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• 204policies in practice. This is similar to the arguable divide between
205
constitutional ideals and the secrecy of the Philadelphia Convention.
Given the significance of openness as a constitutional value and the special
risks that secrecy will be used and abused on case-by-case bases, it is
important that Presidents and officials be required to abide, case-by-case,
with whatever access policies have been crafted on the statutory level. Of
course, statutory decisions can always be amended as needed. To the extent
that information "slips through" before amendment can occur, this is
consistent with the notion that any access "errors" should favor openness
rather than secrecy in light of constitutional values.
The protective nature of statutory breadth is exemplified by clashes over
the public release of photographic evidence of the Abu Ghraib prisoner
abuse. While there is good reason to believe that these photographs are
covered by the FOIA and, thus, should be released, the U.S. government
refused the FOIA request to release such evidence, citing exemptions from
the FOIA.20 6 More importantly, when members of Congress were shown
1,800 Abu Ghraib slides, "[T]he overwhelming response, besides revulsion,
was, in the words of Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John
Warner (R-Va.), that the pictures 'should not be made public."''0 7 While
today's Congress is not the same Congress that passed the FOIA, Congress's
response to the photos nonetheless reflects a more general phenomenon:
the likelihood that officials will support abstract openness principles but be
tempted to deviate from such principles on case-by-case bases. This is why
breadth of statutory application is an important means to protect openness
interests, just as broad free speech protections safeguard unpopular views
that might not be protected were free speech doled out on case-by-case
bases. The importance of broad openness protections is further exemplified
by the fact that, at least for now, the FOIA's general policies seem to have
prevailed over Congress's distaste for openness in the case at hand: a federal
district court recently deemed disclosure of the photographs mandated
under the FOIA.2 °8
Of course, a statute's drafters can always provide for case-by-case review
by the judiciary to weigh the benefits of openness against any infringement
on the President's ability to perform his Article II functions. It is important,
however, that such a provision itself results from a meta-policy judgment
about the nature of the check that should be imposed on presidential
204. See supra Part I.
205. See supra Part III.B.2., Part III.B.3.d.
206. See ACLU v. Dep't of Def., 389 F. Supp. 2d 547, 568-79 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Matt Welch,
The Pentagon's Secret Stash: Why We'll Never See the Second Round of Abu Ghraib Photos, (Apr. 2005),
available at http://www.reason.com/0504/co.mw.the.shtml.
207. Welch, supra note 206.
208. ACLU, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 568-79.
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secrecy. And, of course, any such judgment should remain subject to
renewed political consideration over time.
C. LIMITATIONS ON THE ARGUMENT
That executive privilege does not provide a valid legal basis to invalidate
statutorily authorized requests for information does not mean that there are
no other such legal bases. In considering the possible validity of other legal
objections to statutorily authorized requests for information, it is useful to
recall the substantive nature of an executive privilege claim. Because an
executive privilege claim is grounded in the President's purported need for
autonomy in formulating plans and in defending national security, it is best
understood as a claim that is extrinsic to the internal validity of the
congressional inquiry or legislation at issue. For example, executive privilege
claims against congressional committee requests are best understood as
claims to the effect that, even if the committee is requesting information
within the scope of Article I powers, the committee still faces an extrinsic
limitation borne of the President's need for autonomy. Similarly, executive
privilege claims most logically are understood as claims based on Article II
and thus on the unique status of the President, rather than on privacy
interests or other individual rights that might be shared by private
individuals.
Given the nature of an executive privilege claim, there remains room
for at least three types of objections to legislatively authorized information
requests: Arguments that requested information involves matters outside of
the requesting body's constitutional powers; individual-rights based
arguments such as those grounded in a President's personal privacy; and
statutory interpretation claims.
1. The Scope of Congress's Legislative and Oversight Domain
This Article's arguments for statutory finality with respect to executive
privilege claims rest partly on the inter-branch and dialogic nature of most
political decision-making under the Constitution. As discussed earlier, the
open, deliberative, and shared nature of most political decision-making is
meant to protect the public.209 This fact, combined with a broader
constitutional grounding in openness, suggests that any presidential
decision-making that is constrained by some level of inter-branch control is
subject, among those constraints, to forced openness stemming from
statutory authorization.
The connection of this Article's arguments to inter-branch checking
more generally suggests the continued legitimacy of one type of argument
against information requests. Specifically, it suggests the viability of
arguments to the effect that such requests are internally problematic
209. See supra Part II1.B.1.c.
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because they relate to a matter beyond the scope of the requesting body's
powers. Thus, in the rare case that Congress or a chamber or committee
thereof requests information that extends beyond its constitutional
powers-say, if a House committee were to seek documents about a
Supreme Court nominee unrelated to legislation and hence tied only to the
senatorial "advise and consent" function-an argument might successfully
be made that the requesting entity simply has no prerogative within this
limited domain.
As a descriptive matter, Supreme Court review of such claims generally
strikes a balance between making clear that intrinsic limits exist on the scope
210of Congress's legislative and oversight powers, while suggesting also that
such scope is very broad and that deference is due Congress's judgments as
to the information pertinent to its tasks. 2 1 Thus, the drawing of some lines is
deemed appropriate in those cases where Congress, or a subset thereof,
seeks information about something with respect to which it has no role, as in
the hypothetical House request forjudicial nominee information.
It also bears noting that the logic underlying a challenge based on
Congress's internal limitations militates against applying this Article's pro-
openness arguments to the judiciary. This is not to suggest that openness
directives with respect to the judiciary are categorically unconstitutional.
Indeed, there are strong arguments and some supporting doctrine
suggesting that judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings alone are subject to
212First Amendment public access directives. Furthermore, limited inquiries
into judicial conduct, say, for impeachment purposes, may fall within
213Congress's investigative domain. Nonetheless, because Article III is
directed in part toward ensuring a substantial zone ofjudicial independence
and because the bulk of this Article's constitutional arguments relate
specifically to Articles I and II and to the political process, those arguments
do not translate automatically to the realm of congressional inquiries into
judicial conduct. Any arguments regarding judicial openness therefore must
stand on their own.
2. Individual Rights Based Objections
Another viable category of argument includes individual rights claims,
such as privacy claims or First Amendment claims that might be brought by
210. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111-12, 132-33 (1959); Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955);
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 173-77
(1927); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190, 192-95 (1880).
211. See, e.g., Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 111-12; Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187; Tenney, 341 U.S. at 378;
McGrain, 273 U.S. at 173-80.
212. See generally, e.g., Kitrosser, supra note 14.
213. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (discussing breadth of Senate's power
to try impeachments of federal judges).
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the President or by other executive branch officials. While such claims are
not categorically unavailing, they generally will carry less weight than would
similar claims brought by private citizens given the public nature of the
executive branch offices at issue.214 While a detailed discussion of the topic is
beyond this Article's scope, it is useful to consider that the zones of privacy
and private deliberation that the constitutional system rings around private
individuals in the United States are much more robust than any such zones
around government officials acting in public capacities.215 While a major
premise of our constitutional system is that private individuals are
autonomous beings who in many respects own and answer to themselves,
another major premise of our system is that public officials acting in their
public capacities are "owned by" and must answer to the people.216
Furthermore, it seems likely that any individual rights claim would overlap
with a claim to the effect that the inquiry is beyond the scope of Congress's
powers because it focuses predominantly on private information.
3. Statutory Interpretation
Finally, judicial enforcement of statutorily authorized information
demands is subject to courts' statutory interpretation. While a detailed
discussion of statutory interpretation is well beyond this Article's scope,
three guidelines bear mention. The first cautions against judicial
overreaching to construe statutes narrowly, while the second acknowledges
that legislative intent to accommodate past executive privilege case law
should be considered. The third emphasizes the importance of considering
statutory directives as to when and how any judicial enforcement should
occur.
First, to the extent that this Article questions existing executive privilege
case law, it follows that the judiciary should not construe statutes narrowly to
avoid constitutional questions perceived to arise under such case law.
Instead, one should recognize that the weighing of the relative merits of
secrecy and access conducted during the legislative process is conclusive of
any questions raised by executive privilege claims. Additionally, such a
change in the judiciary's approach to construing access statutes would better
hold members of Congress and Presidents to the relatively broad principles
articulated in statutory access decisions without enabling them to duck these
principles in case-by-case fights over executive privilege, unless such case-by-
214. See, e.g., Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 455-68 (1977). It also is possible
that a claim, such as a First Amendment claim, might be brought on behalf of private
individuals or groups who speak with the President. See, e.g., Jay S. Bybee, Advising the President:
Separation-of-Powers and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 104 YALE L.J. 51, 120-22 (1994).
215. Cf., e.g., Nixon, 433 U.S. at 455-68; BOK, supra note 14, at 110, 246; Seth F. Kreimer,
Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law,
140 U. PA. L. REv. 1,67 (1991).
216. Cf, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 215, at 6-7.
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case fights are provided for on the meta, statutory level. These benefits are
of constitutional dimension as they help to further the shallowness and
political oversight of executive secrecy.
Second, complicating the matter of statutory interpretation is the fact
that some access statutes may reflect assumptions that their directives are
and should be challengeable in court on case-by-case bases. For example, a
provision in the statute creating the 9/11 Commission states that
information shall be provided to the Commission pursuant to subpoenas "to
the extent authorized by law."217 On the one hand, such a provision might
be construed as encompassing assumptions about the law of executive
privilege at the time of the statute's enactment and thus as requiring judicial
balancing. On the other hand, such a provision might be construed as a
catch-all provision intended to incorporate whatever law might exist at the
time that a legal challenge arises. Faced with such a question, the judiciary
should apply standard tools of statutory interpretation but should not
employ a constitutional avoidance doctrine to err on the side of narrowness
as discussed in the preceding paragraph.
Third, some statutory access directives themselves embody values of
deliberativeness in overseeing executive secrecy at the secondary, case-by-
case level of oversight. As noted earlier, for example, congressional
committees have a statutory subpoena power and the statutory ability to
enforce such power through criminal contempt actions upon the majority
vote of a congressional chamber." s The requirement of a chamber vote
prior to certifying a criminal case to the U.S. Attorney21 9 suggests a desire to
provide deliberation and open debate before forcing disclosure. While this
statutory provision applies broadly to any refusals to provide information, it
has special value for facilitating careful consideration of refusals grounded
in executive branch autonomy values. The judiciary must ensure that any
statutory procedures necessary to trigger judicial enforcement are followed.
At the same time, the judiciary should not overreach to create process-based
hurdles in the name of constitutional avoidance.
217. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-306, § 605(c)(1),
116 Stat. 2383, 2411 (2002). The statute also provides that "[any public hearings of the
Commission shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the protection of information
provided to or developed for or by the Commission as required by any applicable statute,
regulation, or Executive order." Id. § 606(c).
218. 2 U.S.C. §§ 192, 194 (2000).
219. Id. § 194. But see supra note 187 (noting that a separate question is raised as to whether
a U.S. Attorney constitutionally can be forced by Congress to bring such a prosecution).
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V. REFLECTIONS ON THE POLICY NATURE OF THE QUESTIONS AT ISSUE
IN EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE CLASHES ANDJUDICIAL TENDENCIES IN EVALUATING
THOSE QUESTIONS
This Article's constitutional arguments have force independent of how
the judiciary actually handles its existing role in executive privilege disputes
or of the real costs and benefits of executive secrecy. Nonetheless, some
attention to these factors bolsters this Article's arguments in two respects.
First, by demonstrating the very real risks and potential misuses of executive
branch secrecy, such attention accentuates the fact that arguments in favor
of executive privilege are mere policy judgments, and highly contestable
ones at that, not static constitutional truths. Second, by demonstrating the
judiciary's tendency to defer to executive privilege or to related pro-secrecy
claims, particularly when national security is invoked, it suggests the wisdom
of a constitutional structure grounded in the view that self-interested
political forces are the best means to guard against tyrannical political
secrecy.
Arguments for high-level executive branch secrecy, while surely on the
mark sometimes, nonetheless are contestable policy judgments with respect
to which abundant counter-arguments exist. Indeed, countless scholars,
journalists, legislators, and executive branch officials have noted secrecy's
judgment-clouding and security-hindering effects in relation to historic and
current events. For examples of such criticism, one needs to look no further
than commentary on the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It has been argued
repeatedly that the reticence of the press and of Congress to ask difficult
questions prior to the invasion of Iraq combined with the Bush
administration's penchant for secrecy created an insular White House
environment in which debate was stifled, "groupthink"2 0 flourished, and
questionable data on weapons of mass destruction were embraced while
221predictions of a peaceful, post-invasion Iraq similarly went unquestioned.
220. Barbara Ehrenreich framed the problem of groupthink and its relationship to the Iraq
war well when she wrote in July of 2004: "[W]hile the capacity for groupthink is an endearing
part of our legacy as social animals, it's also a common precondition for self-destruction. One
thousand coalition soldiers have died because the C.I.A. was so eager to go along with the
emperor's delusion that he was actually wearing clothes." Barbara Ehrenreich, Editorial, All
Together Now, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2004, at A23.
221. See, e.g., Gregory P. Magarian, The First Amendment, the Public-Private Distinction, and
Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 118-21 (2004);
Alasdair Roberts, National Security and Open Government, 9:2 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REV. 69, 75 (2004);
Andrew Rosenthal, Editorial, Decoding the Senate Intelligence Committee Investigation on Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, July 18, 2004, § 4, at 12; Ron Suskind, Without a Doubt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2004, § 6
(Magazine), at 44; Bruce Berkowitz, Secrecy and National Security, HOOVER DIG., No. 3 (2004),
available at http://www.hooverdigest.org/043/berkowitz.html. Bob Drogin & John Goetz, The
Curneball Saga: How U.S. Fell Under the Spell of "Curveball, " L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2005, at 1,
http://www.commodreams.org/headlines/05/1120-01.htin; Editorial, A Pause for Hindsight,
N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2004, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/16/opinion/
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For example, three versions of a pre-invasion intelligence estimate were
prepared by the administration. While all three concluded "that Saddam
Hussein was a major threat . . .the first, long, classified one was peppered
with reservations. A declassified version that was given to Congress erased
most of the doubts. The even shorter public version had no caveats at all.
"
,
22
The possibly drastic consequences of such information-hoarding is
evidenced by statements that "Congress would never have given President
Bush a blank check for military action if it had known that there was no real
evidence that Iraq was likely to provide aid to terrorists or was capable of
inflicting grave damage on our country or our allies"223 and by the drop in
public support for military action in Iraq as the realities of post-invasion Iraq
224
and the weaknesses of the pre-invasion case for war surfaced. Intra-
executive branch secrecy also played a part in pre-invasion intelligence
failures. As Bruce Berkowitz explains:
CIA analysts assessing reports from the field sometimes believed
they were reading information from several sources that
corroborated each other, when in fact the reports all came from a
single source-and were wrong. The analysts did not know they
were making a mistake because security rules designed to protect
secrets-"compartmentation" and "need to know"-prevented
225them from knowing the identity of the source.
Similar concerns have been raised about the negative impact of secrecy
on homeland security, both prior to, and in the wake of, September 11.
"Thomas H. Kean, chairman of the Sept. 11 commission and a former
Republican governor of New Jersey, said the failure to prevent the 2001
attacks was rooted not in leaks of sensitive information but in the barriers to
sharing information between agencies and with the public. 2 26 Similarly,
congressional investigators have observed that "CIA and National Security
Agency reports regarding the terrorist threat to the United States [prior to
September l1th] were so highly classified that they were not even made
available to FBI agents in the field who might have been able to act on
16FRI.html; Report Slams CIA for Iraq Intelligence Failures, CNN.COM, July 9, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/07/09/senate.intelligence/index.html.
222. Andrew Rosenthal, supra note 221, at A12; see also, e.g., Report Slams CIA for Iraq
Intelligence Failures, supra note 221.
223. Editorial, A Pause for Hindsight, supra note 221; see also, e.g., Dana Milbank & Walter
Pincus, Asterisks Dot White House's Iraq Argument, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2005, at Al (reporting
that Congress did not have access to the same pre-war intelligence that the White House did).
224. See, e.g., Poll: Bush's Iraq Rating at Low Point, CNN.COM, Aug. 5, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/08/05/bush.ap.ipsospoll.ap/index.html.
225. Berkowitz, supra note 221.
226. Shane, supra note 5, at 114; see also Editorial, The Dangerous Comfort of Secrecy, N.Y.
TIMES,July 12, 2005, at A20.
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,,221them. Concerns have been raised that the rush to hide yet more
information in the wake of September 1lth will prove counter-productive to
the public good, keeping the public in the dark about everything from
228nuclear safety risks to the diminution of civil liberties.
Similar analyses about more distant historical events abound. Writing
about the Vietnam War, James C. Thompson, who served in the Kennedy
and Johnson administrations during the war, posed the question: "How did
men of superior ability, sound training, and high ideals-American policy-
makers of the 1960s-create such costly and divisive policy?" 2 9 He attributed
the situation partly to:
[T]he "closed politics" of policy-making as issues become hot: the
more sensitive the issue, and the higher it rises in the bureaucracy,
the more completely the experts are excluded while the harassed
senior generalists take over (that is, the Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, and Presidential Assistants). The frantic
skimming of briefing papers in the back seats of limousines is no
substitute for the presence of specialists; furthermore, in times of
crisis such papers are deemed "too sensitive" even for review by the
specialists.
2 30
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, in his extensive study of government secrecy
in the United States, chronicles profound misunderstandings by the United
States of the nature of the military and strategic threats posed by the Soviet
231Union throughout the Cold War. Moynihan attributes these
misunderstandings and subsequent strategic missteps largely to government
232secrecy. As Richard Gid Powers explains in the introduction to
Moynihan's book, Secrecy:
227. Steven Aftergood, The Bush Administration's Suffocating Secrecy, FORWARD, Mar. 28, 2003,
at 9; see also, e.g., Berkowitz, supra note 221 ("Investigators examining the September 11 terrorist
attacks found that intelligence organizations were often unable to share information with
intelligence users and thus could not provide effective warning. In other cases, intelligence
organizations could not share information with each other and thus were unable to work
effectively together.").
228. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 221, at 77-82; Trudy Lieberman, Homeland Security: What
We Don't Know Can Hurt Us, COLUM.JOURNALISM REv., Sept./Oct. 2004, at 24; Charlie Savage, In
Terror War's Name, Public Loses Information, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 24, 2005, at Al; The Costs of
Secrecy, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2005, at A16; NOW with Bill Moyers (PBS television broadcast Dec.
12, 2003) (transcript on file with Iowa Law Review).
229. James C. Thompson, Jr., How Could Vietnam Happen ?, THE ATLANTIC, Apr. 1968, at 47-
53, available at http://www.echeat.com/essay.php?t=25543.
230. Id.; see also Roberts, supra note 221, at 73-74 (discussing the Vietnam War and
Thomson article). Raoul Berger also attributes much of the misguided decision-making of the
Vietnam War to executive branch secrecy. BERGER, supra note 18, at 265-85.
231. See generally MOYNIHAN, supra note 2.
232. Id.
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Moynihan realized that the most pressing intelligence problems of
the Cold War had really been questions for the social scientist. How
dynamic was the Soviet Union? What was the strength of
its economy? How stable was its social order and its ethnic
structure? . . . [S]ecrecy made scientific investigation of these
problems impossible, since, in order to be scientific, analysis
requires that information be available to all for criticism and
reevaluation.233
Moynihan also attributes the rise of McCarthyism to executive branch
secrecy. Explaining Moynihan's view, Powers writes: "McCarthy would have
been nothing without government secrecy. He was able to gain hearing for
his fantastic charges only because he could claim that the evidence to
,,234
support them was kept hidden by the executive branch.
Moynihan's observations aboutJoseph McCarthy call to mind a distinct
but related risk of government secrecy: that secrecy not only will be misused
by well-meaning yet overzealous officials, but that it will intentionally be
misused by those set on manipulating public debate toward their own ends.
Indeed, McCarthy's exploitation of government secrecy calls to mind Vice
President Cheney's recent attempts to perpetuate the theory of a link
between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein through vague public allusions to
evidence in the administration's possession of which others, including the
2159/11 Commission, supposedly were not aware. Similarly, concerns long
have been raised about executive branch "spinning of information" through
selective declassification or leakage of otherwise classified information.3 6
Raul Berger invokes the likelihood of executive misuse as a counterpoint to
the argument that secrecy facilitates candid discussions. Berger asks:
Can it be maintained that protection for such "candid interchange"
is of greater public benefit than plenary congressional investigation
which exposed the maladministration over persistent executive
heel-dragging and deception? Rather, the knowledge that every
such recommendation or communication will be open to scrutiny
237serves as an excellent deterrent to chicanery.
These examples illustrate the extent to which policy arguments favoring
executive branch secrecy often are grounded in highly questionable
233. Id. at 13; see also, e.g., id. at 181, 197-98.
234. Id. at 27.
235. See, e.g., Philip Shenon, Leaders of 9/11 Panel Answer Information Claim by Cheney, N.Y.
TIMES, July 7, 2004, at A18; Philip Shenon & Richard W. Stevenson, Leaders of 9/11 Panel Ask
Cheney for Reports that Would Support Iraq-Al Qaeda Ties, N.Y. TIMES,June 19, 2004, at A8.
236. See, e.g., Note, Keeping Secrets, supra note 12, at 910-14; Dana Priest, A Clash on Classified
Documents, WrASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2004, at Al2.
237. BERGER, supra note 18, at 239.
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empirical assumptions. This point casts thejudiciary's tendency to err on the
side of deference to presidential secrecy claims in particularly harsh light.
The grounding of executive privilege claims in questionable policy
judgments toward which the judiciary often defers exemplifies the wisdom
of a constitutional structure reliant largely on robust inter-branch
competition and resulting statutory controls to check executive branch
secrecy. As I have argued elsewhere, substantive judicial intervention may be
necessary as a protective floor when the political process cannot be counted
on to address government secrecy, as in the context of adjudicative
238proceedings. This is not unlike the judicial role in protecting individual
rights more generally-while the judiciary has been known to deemphasize
individual rights in times of perceived crises, the judiciary may offer the only
hope, however scant, of protection against majority tyranny in such
contexts.23 9 Yet, it is another question entirely whether the judiciary should
second-guess the substantive issues where the statutory process and a
secondary, implementing body take a stand against executive secrecy. In the
latter cases, constitutional structure counsels strongly in favor of letting the
legislative process run its course. That this conclusion is bolstered by
historical experience suggests the wisdom of the structural framework.
VI. CONCLUSION
One of the past year's top news stories has involved revelations of an
extensive, secret wire-tapping program authorized by the White House in
the wake of September 11.240 The program is controversial due partly to the
separation of powers issues it raises. First, despite White House protestations
to the contrary, there appears to be no congressional authorization for the
program.241 Second, in keeping with the lack of multi-branch involvement,
the White House kept the program secret from the public and from all but a
few congresspersons (who the White House ordered not to disclose the
238. Kitrosser, supra note 14, at 130-45.
239. See, e.g., David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in
Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565, 2565-68 (2003). But see generally, e.g., Oren Gross, Chaos
and Rules: Should Response to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003)
(arguing that extra-constitutional emergency powers should be accepted due in part to courts'
poor performance in times of crisis).
240. See, e.g., Tom Daschle, Op-Ed., Power We Didn't Grant, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2005, at
A21; Eric Lichtblau & David E. Sanger, Administration Cites War Vote in Spying Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 20, 2005, § 1, at Al; David E. Sanger, Bush Says He Ordered Domestic Spying, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
18, 2005, § 1, at 1.
241. See, e.g., Daschle, supra note 240; Lichtblau & Sanger, supra note 240; Sanger, supra
note 240; ELIZABETH B. BAZAN & JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV.,
PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT WARRANTLESS ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE TO GATHER
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
intel/m010506.pdf.
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242information) until it was leaked to the press. Foremost among the Bush
Administration's responses to the leak has been a defense of the secrecy in
which it shrouded the program and criticism of those responsible for the
leak.243 President Bush has argued that because of the leak, "our enemies
have learned information that they should not have, and the unauthorized
disclosure of this effort damages our national security and puts our citizens
at risk. ", 44 He also has cautioned against public congressional hearings on
the program, stating that "public hearings on programs will say to the
enemy, 'Here's what they do, adjust.' 245
Also in the news of late are clashes regarding the Bush Administration's
unwillingness to release documents to the Senate Judiciary Committee
regarding past and present executive branch work of Supreme Court
nominees John Roberts, Harriet Miers, and Samuel Alito. In reference to
requests for papers involving Miers, for example, President Bush told
reporters: "I just can't tell you how important it is for us to guard executive
privilege in order for there to be crisp decision making in the White
House.
, 246
Not only are executive privilege debates alive and well, then, but the
more fundamental questions that they embody-questions as to the need
and entitlement of each branch and the public for information-continue
to manifest themselves in a host of issues ranging from executive privilege to
informal information disputes to classification policy. An observation by
Bruce Ackerman about the secret-wiretapping controversy illustrates what is
at stake in these debates. Ackerman writes:
Suppose the president's legal position on the spying question were
correct and that he actually had the unilateral powers his lawyers
say he has. Then it would be especially important for him to
exercise this authority publicly and tell us when he was creating a
new spying operation. Under this scenario, the only power
Americans would have left against presidential abuse is precisely
the power to mobilize and insist that Congress rein the president
in. By keeping his decisions a secret, the president insulates himself
from the last check and balance against excess. This should have
no place in a constitutional democracy.247
242. See, e.g., Lichtblau & Sanger, supra note 240; Sanger, supra note 240; Bruce Ackerman,
The Secrets They Keep, SLATE.COM, Dec. 20, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2132811.
243. See, e.g., Lichtblau & Sanger, supra note 240; Sanger, supra note 240; Ackerman, supra
note 242.
244. Sanger, supra note 240.
245. Lichtblau & Sanger, supra note 240.
246. Richard W. Stevenson, President, Citing Executive Privilege, Indicates He'll Reject Requests for
Counsel's Documents, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2005, at A21.
247. Ackerman, supra note 242.
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In other words, there can be no checks and balances-public or
congressional-against a program that is implemented in secret unless the
very fact of the program, including the need for secret implementation, is
disclosed and publicly debated. Such public debate is not without a degree
of risk, as is the possibility that the debate will lead to poor choices. But
there is substantial risk as well in facilitating the deep secrecy of such
programs so that even their very existence and the secrecy in which they are
shrouded are immune to checks. Constitutional text, structure, and history
suggest that government should err on the side of openness and checking.
More precisely, text, structure, and history suggest that while secrecy is not
categorically illegitimate, it must remain a shallow and politically
controllable tool of the people, subject to the checks and balances that
characterize the federal political system as a whole and that are meant to
serve as bulwarks against tyranny.
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